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It was the 6th of September, 2019, when the question was asked “What is 
freedom?”, the professor looked around the class, asked a couple of students if they 
could provide an answer to this question, to which the professor replied; “No”, he 
shook his head, and his eyes rested at the front row, where I was sitting; “could you 
tell me what freedom is?”- I hesitated and said; well, it depends on how you define 
freedom – the professor nodded – I continued; you see, it depends on the context, 
situation and who you would ask this question, because each person has their own 
understanding of what freedom entails;  
That was exactly the answer he was looking for. 
 
The answer I kept to myself was;  
For me, freedom is a feeling, 
For me, freedom is feeling the wind through my hair, the sun on my face, the 
smell of the sea, the friendliness of passers-by (1Agoeie!), while I steadily navigate 
my motorboat through the calm waters of Friesland.  
 






The 21st Century, otherwise known as the Post-Truth Era, requires more and 
more justification. Simultaneously, a shift has been taking place, in which there is 
moved from a time in which arguments and justifications were based on pure 
knowledge, episteme, to a time in which the same processes of argumentation and 
justification, striving for legitimation, have been based on the appeal to values and 
beliefs. In a Post-Truth Era, not only (political) institutions, demos, and societal 
processes have been undergoing change, but the way in which realities are being 
constructed as well. This results in the need to offer a [fresh] perspective when it comes 
to theoretical realities and applications, and their translations into practice. In this 
dissertation, the phenomena of European governmentality and public reason are 
studied by looking at the role of fundamental rights in the formation of public reason 
in the European Union. To do so, through the methodological study of governmentality 
and the theoretical study of public reason in the EU, methods and tools of analysis were 
determined, encompassing primary and secondary information, making use of 
historical analysis, platform analysis, framing and narrative construction analysis, 
comparative analysis and case study analysis. The result show that, in a post-truth era, 
shared sets of reasoning, justification, self-/group-identification of a demos in a 
structure beyond the nation-state, enabled through European governmentality, can be 
established in the absence of a ratified constitution by using law as a strategic 
framework and creating normative standards of behaviour through strategies and action 
plans. 
Key words: European Union, governmentality, public reason, fundamental 
rights, democracy, institutions, political processes, values and identity, post-national 
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Тема ВКР актуальна в нескольких смыслах и определяется выходом 
властных структур за пределы национального государства и их способностью 
формировать и регулировать поведение, институционализацией ценностей и 
основных прав, изучением международных организаций и наднациональных 
властных структур, проблемой основных прав в политической и моральной 
философии. Европейский Союз представляет собой уникальный пример 
управления, существующего за пределами государства, где, в свою очередь, 
могут возникнуть вопросы о его легитимности. В то же время в этих реалиях 
возникают новые процессы формирования публичного разума, которые 
захватывают проблему фундаментальных прав, доминирующей в менталитете 
современной политической философии.  В работе рассматривается влияние 
европейской управленческой ментальности на формирование публичного 
разума в Европейском Союзе. 
Целью работы является исследование проблемы формирования 
публичного разума вне национальной (государственной) идентичности.  
Практическое значение этого исследования состоит в использовании 
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и списка использованной литературы. 
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formation of public reason in the European Union. 
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outside national (state) identity. 
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Through the (de)(re)construction of the conduct of conduct, we as political 
scientists are searching for the formula to create the perfect system and the perfect 
citizen. However, as political systems are changing, our job, as the mechanics of the 
system, is changing as well. The technical and geographical borders of the nation state 
are eroding; the number of actors able to participate in the construction of the conduct 
of conduct, consciously or unconsciously, has been growing.  
The problematics of the 21st century, issues of humanity, political systems and 
structures of governance; the emergence of power structures beyond the state result in 
the need to update theory, to ensure that it could be translated into practice; changes 
occur while humans are still catching up with the last changes; from digital and 
technological solutions to an online civilization, from traditional media to new media, 
social media and social networks. The digitalised world led to the rise of new 
alterations regarding news, information and (democratic) participation; people want 
information fast, accurate, at the right place and the right time, and have become even 
more vulnerable to manipulation. At the same time, there has been a shift from a time 
in which argumentation was based on facts, to a time in which argumentation is based 
on the anticipation of emotions and beliefs; the border between objectivity and 
subjectivity is eroding, interpreted based on intersubjectivity; our truth. Have we 
entered an era in which Doxa and Gnosis replace Episteme, or is a post-truth our new 
Endoxa?  
I argue that, this very issue, is being anticipated on, there is a shift in the political, 
following this general trend, the one that could be described as despicable, (political) 
actors are left no other choice but to walk the path of the post-truth era, entering a 
forest, of which the landscape has not been visualised yet, but could be manipulated at, 
the moment in which you think you figured out the rules of the game. The question 
who determines the rules of the game in a post-truth era is a rhetorical one; it is identity 
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politics, offering another one, explanation, creation, interpretation, and categorisation: 
us vs. them. The point is that, an increasing number of actors have been enabled to enter 
the stage, from which the reality of an average citizen is being presented. Shaping the 
reality of citizens and creating the ideal citizen is a core function carried out by a 
national government, each having their own culture and perception of what is right and 
wrong, and deciding what mechanisms, tools and technologies are employed in doing 
so. Considering our (online) civilisation, citizen and watch-dog organisations, 
customer-driven government-citizens relations, the nature of politics itself is changing, 
or are we on our way back to Ancient Greece, where “everyone”, those who were 
considered to be part of the in-group allowed to participate, should directly participate 
in the public political forum? Throughout time, different systems  developed, 
collapsed, changed, or have even been combined. Taking into consideration that in 
political science, there is still being looked for all-encompassing approaches towards 
the state, power, legitimacy, the political, the aim of this study is to contribute to the 
discussion of these concepts, in an implicit way, by focusing on governmentality and 
public reason in the European Union, a structure about which there is much to say; 
from the Coal and Steel Industry into a Value Enforcing Machinery.  
The European Union. A union, consisting out of 27 Member States, 24 official 
languages, twenty-seven histories, cultural traditions, political landscapes. The co-
existence of these differences has been referred to by Rawls (1997) as comprehensive 
doctrines, or reasonable pluralism. Public unrest, deeply rooted in the divergent 
histories, triggered by the four freedoms, the Euro-crisis, Brexit. The European Union 
in all of its shapes goes against the traditional conception of the nation state, referring 
to the Westphalian System (1648) (McCormick, 2015). Democratic standards and 
values are at the core of mutual agreement on the common understanding of all 
Member States about how the EU should function, and which criteria a prospective 
Member State should meet. As the EU moved far beyond the purpose of an 
international organisation and cannot be categorised as a sovereign state, questions 
have been raised about its legitimacy, democracy, transparency and accountability. The 
European Union started as an economic and peace project, of which the ultimate dream 
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was to create the Federation of the European Union, or the United States of Europe. 
However, with the replacement of the federal goal by an ever-closer Union, it became 
even less clear what the end state of this project was ought to be. Some argue that the 
EU only works in practice, from (quasi-)federalism, confederalism, 
(neo)functionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism, many more, still, no one has 
succeeded to make the EU work in theory, as it works in practice. The European Union 
started as a Coal and Steel Community (1952), and grew into what some call, an 
unidentifiable political object (UPO), or a system in its own right, or what I call, a value 
enforcing machinery. Throughout the years, the EU went through different stages of 
regional and economic integration, revolving all around the Single Market: from Rome, 
to the Single European Act, to Maastricht, to Amsterdam, Nice, and finally, to Lisbon 
(2007). The Single European Act (1986), set the goal for the completion of the internal 
market by 1993, paving the way for political integration and the economic and 
monetary Union. In these transformations, with an eye on expansion, the Copenhagen 
Criteria (1993) were adopted, to ensure the compliance of new Member States with 
political, economic and institutional standards. The EU that is known today was 
established in the same year, with the Maastricht Treaty; replacing the federal goal by 
an ever-closer Union, establishing the concept of European identity and Union 
citizenship. The EU is all about promoting peace, its values, and the well-being of its 
people. The principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law form the foundation in constructing (the future of) Europe. 
European integration: refers to the process of the further development of the 
European Union since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) (1952). There are different approaches towards the study of the EU, the most 
popular approaches include: federalism, (neo)functionalism, (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance.   
Governmentality 
“Basically, if I had wanted to give the lectures I am giving this year a more exact title, I 
certainly would not have chosen “security, territory, population.” What I would really like to 
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undertake is something that I would call a history of “governmentality”” (Foucault 1978, 2007, p. 
144).  
In the 1970s, the concept of governmentality was born during a series of lectures 
by Michel Foucault; Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France. 
In accordance with Foucault, “governmentality” has three meanings:  
(1) A complex ensemble of structures. Governmentality is understood as an ensemble, 
encompassing institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and 
tactics, that enable the exercise of a specific but complex power, of which the demos 
is the target group, of which political economy serves as the foundation of 
knowledge, for which apparatuses of security would be its essential element 
(Foucault, 1978, 2007).  
(2) A tendency, a type of power. In this aspect, Foucault (1978, 2007) defines 
governmentality as a tendency that has led towards the supremacy of the type of 
power that is called “government” over all other forms of power, leading to the 
development of specific governmental apparatuses, as well as a series of 
knowledges. 
(3) A result of a process. According to Foucault (1978, 2007), efforts should be taken 
to build an understanding of the process, or rather, the result of the process “by 
which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state…and 
was gradually ‘governmentalized’” (p. 144). 
The State. According to Foucault (1978), the survival and limits of the state 
could be understood through the general tactics of governmentality. Next, there has 
been proposed to reconstruct the major forms, the major economies of power by 
looking at the state of justice, the administrative state (regulations and disciplines), a 
state of government that is not defined by its territory but by the mass of population. 
During his lecture, Foucault posed the following question, “Is it possible to place the 
modern state in a general technology of power that assured its mutations development, 
and functioning?” (2007, pp. 165-166). 
Research objective (1). In the literature review, 1.1 Methodological study of 
governmentality, studies of different scholars will be discussed to determine different 
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approaches in the application of Foucault’s concept of governmentality in the context 
of the European Union (Glenn, 2019; Walters & Haahr, 2005; Merlingen, 2003; 
Toplišek, 2019; Derous & de Roeck, 2019; Zimmerman & Favell, 2011; Muehlenhoff, 
2019; Shore, 2011; İşleyen, 2015). 
Public reason. The idea of public reason, in accordance with Rawls, is 
concerned with the fundamental political relation between the government and that of 
free and equal citizens. The purpose is to determine under what circumstances, in the 
situation in which constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, 
citizens are bound to honour the structure of their constitutional democratic regime 
(Rawls, 1997). At the same time, the interpretation and value added to the decision 
made on political questions would be determined by what citizens regard as the best 
reasons to justify a decision, based on their own idea of the whole truth (Habermas, 
1995). In the discussion of public reason, there is looked at democratic structures, in 
the work of Rawls (1997), public reason is applied to the situation of a constitutional 
democracy. In turn, a constitutional democracy has been interpreted as a deliberative 
democracy. In order to ensure the existence of a deliberative democracy, there is a need 
for widespread education, in which citizens are informed about the basic aspects of the 
constitutional democracy in which they are situated. The absence of widespread 
education on these matters, a public uninformed about pressing problems, would result 
in the inability to take crucial political and social decisions. Therefore, there is a need 
to identify principles and guidelines informing the framework of public reason that 
would be appealed to in the public political forum (Habermas, 1995). The identification 
of the aforementioned aspects has been framed as the original position in Rawls’ work 
on political liberalism. Public reason is formed in different environments, relating to 
the discussion of a fundamental political question, which ideally leads to the outcome 
that the political decision or moral idea could be reasonably accepted and justified by 
all those concerned. The question whether the design of the original position by Rawls 
was a wise one, will be further outlined based on critique provided for by Habermas 
(1995) in the literature review. 
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Norms. The input for decisions concerning what one is ought to do is provided 
for by norms; equal and exceptionless obligations on all governed by a structure of 
norms are imposed by those norms that are recognized; informing the normative 
standard of generalized behavioural expectations. Moreover, Habermas (1995) stated 
that norms have an obligatory nature, an absolute meaning; an unconditional and 
universal duty.  
Values. The input for decisions concerning what conduct would be the most 
desirable is provided for by values. Apart from that, values serve to express the ranking 
order of goods based on preferability. Values or goods, could only be realised or 
acquired through purposive action, establishing a fixed relation of preference on the 
ranking order of certain goods; why some would be considered more attractive than 
others (Habermas, 1995). 
Reflective equilibrium. Furthermore, Habermas aimed to examine whether 
overlapping consensus plays a cognitive or an instrumental role. In determining 
underlying normative ideas, a method of reflective equilibrium was used by Rawls, 
that is via a reconstruction of proven intuitions. Those intuitions would be found in the 
traditions and practices of a democratic society. A reflective equilibrium is reached 
when a philosopher succeeds to attain the word that these intuitions can no longer be 
rejected with good reasons by those involved. 
Research objective (2) 
2.1 In the literature review (1.2 Theoretical study on public reason in the 
European Union), the concept of public reason will be explained with the use of Rawls 
(1997), Habermas (1995); 
2.2 supplemented with studies on public reason in a supranational context 
(Sadurski, 2015; Petersmann, 2008; Douglass-Scott, 2015), multi-level governance 
structure (Crum, 2017; Kjaer, 2017).  
2.3 Simultaneously, public reason will be placed in the context of the European 
Union, by directly elaborating on key concepts outlined by the aforementioned authors, 
complemented with a broad range of authors, from political science (e.g., Maurer, 
2020; Crespy & Parks, 2019; McCormick, 2015; Bee, 2008; Jacobs & Maier, 1998), 
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legal studies, constitutional law (Sadurski, 2015; Murray, 2016), European law 
(Timmermans, 2016; Murray, 2016; Raulus, 2016), European political science 
(Högenauer et al., 2016; Oxelheim et al., 2020), international law, educational 
philosophy and theory (Fejes, 2008), ethics and law (Hermerén, 2008). 
Post-truth. The concept of post-truth is a relatively young one, but that does not 
mean that the sphere in which it exists, the situations in which it could be determined, 
the strategies used by a variety of actors reflecting the existence of a post-truth 
conception or understanding, is a new one. In fact, each individual, collective, 
community, group, collaboration, structure, political party, media outlet, social media 
bubble, family, religion, and so on, has their own perception of the truth, situated in a 
network in which an increasing number of actors are competing for the attention of the 
one under construction, consciously or unconsciously. Post-truth is implicit in its 
existence, if existent, in my opinion, it exists in different areas of life. With the intention 
of integrating it in the discussion of the political, widening the scope of imagination, 
not only in the visualisation of its application, but in the attempts of hypothesising and 
theorising the functioning of different aspects of the political, I introduce another 
reality into this dissertation: the post-truth. 
The motto of the post-truth era is: it does not have to be entirely true what you 
are saying, as long as you believe it, and can convince others. Not a new motto, but 
one that has come to dominate our mentalities, with consequent implications on our 
realities. Therefore, I propose three categories of a post-truth conception in one of the 
perceptions I have of what one of its aspects would entail:  
- The post-truth of information 
- The post-truth of communication 
- The post-truth of argumentation 
In rational choice theory, actors make choices in a structured manner, capable of 
ordering information and evaluating it based on its utilisation, cost-benefits and 
different types of mathematical equations. But who provides the information that is 
subject to rationalisation? 
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In a post-truth era, we select, present and discuss information, not for the purpose 
of rationalisation, but that of reputation. In a post-truth era, we witness the 
mediatization and sensationalisation of the political through the (social) media. In this 
aspect, I suggest three elements to consider: people, money, technology. 
People and information. The psychological structures of human beings, the 
reception of information takes place through categorisations, putting it into boxes to 
store information in our mental capacity of being. 
Money and mediatization. The shift to the digital: people want information fast, 
accurate, at the right place and the right time. Information is narrowed down into 
sensation: big headlines and click-baits: sensationalisation, leading to its further and 
simplified compartmentalisation. 
Technology and technological equations. Algorithms design our bubbles, with 
the intention to show us news and information that we are interested in, based on our 
online self-presentation, cookie-accepting and clicking confirmations. We exist in 
bubbles, we click on sensation, each located behind their own veil of ignorance. A 
pillarized society, not based on religious pillars, but digital pillars, not a set of pillars, 
but individual bubbles. 
A new stage is set based on the change of the psychological structures of people. 
Now, having briefly discussed a simplified reality of a post-truth era, I argue that the 
anticipation on the post-truth of information leads to a change in communication and 
argumentation. Bringing the reality of post-truth closer to political realities; the 
implications of the aforementioned representations, could be observed in the behaviour 
of political actors competing for the attention of a citizen, (informing) strategic choices 
in decision-making, as well as governmental self-representation and visualisation.  
Competing for attention. In competing for attention, political actors anticipate 
on the emotions and beliefs of those they are trying to reach, while keeping in mind the 
structure of mental (and/or digital) bubbles, and the tools available in penetrating those 
bubbles. In turn, this anticipation does not only influence the selection of information 
in its presentation, its implications could be reflected during decision-making. Now 
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you may raise the question, but how is this related to the formation of public reason or 
governmentality? 
In this dissertation, no value will be added to the concept of post-truth, i.e., it is 
not right or wrong, instead, it will be used to broaden the scope of imagination in 
studying power structures beyond domestic political systems, starting with the 
utilisation of governmentality to let go of the government in the context of a traditional 
nation state. 
Governmentality offers the necessary tools to adapt to a post-truth era, enabling 
the analysis of power structures, what enables power, and what implicit and explicit 
tools are employed in this process. At this stage, a post-truth era does not change the 
previously outlined ideas of governmentality, as the abstract understanding of 
governmentality offers enough scope for the imagination, a conception of post-truth is 
to be kept in mind when interpreting the to be presented information. 
The design of the original position in public reason (Rawls) has been contested 
by Habermas (1995), who advocated for a procedural conception of practical reasoning 
free of substantive connotations by developing it in a procedural manner. In the idea of 
public reason, basic democratic values as laid down in a constitutional democracy 
inform the existence of public reason and its formation. The original conception offered 
by Rawls could be interpreted in a way that it would suggest us to identify basic 
democratic values, rights, opportunities, guidelines for inquiry. As briefly mentioned, 
problematics exists around the operationalisation of the first-person perspective, the 
original position. While this critique (Habermas, 1995) will be further discussed in the 
next chapter, I would like to add a new perspective to the game, that is, not a first-
person position, but a third-person perspective. 
A third-person perspective. In accordance with my conception of the post-truth, 
there should be let go of the first-person position, the original position of public reason. 
I argue that this could be done by making use of Habermas’ ideal role taking, and 
benchmarking strategies in redesigning the political game in which the formation of 
public reason would take place.  
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Research objective (3). In order to translate the concepts discussed above, 
Governmentality, Public Reason, Post-Truth, into a reality, the issue of the formation 
of public reason outside national (state) identity will be studied. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the issue of the formation of public 
reason outside national (state) identity. Therefore, the object of this study is European 
governmentality and public reason, and the subject is concerned with the role of 
fundamental rights in the formation of public reason in the European Union.  
The research methodology of this study is built upon the three meanings of 
governmentality as introduced by Foucault (1978): A result of a process (European 
integration); A tendency, a type of power (Fundamental rights); A complex ensemble 
of structures (Application and visualisation). In this study, there is made use of primary 
and secondary information, qualitative analysis, making use of historical analysis, 
platform analysis, framing/narrative construction, comparative analysis. A further 
elaboration and explanation can be found in 2. Methodology. 
Structure. This dissertation is written in a European style, starting with the (1) 
Literature review, consisting out of two sub-chapters: 1.1 Methodological study of 
governmentality; 1.2 Theoretical study of public reason in the European Union, 
followed by the (2) Methodology of the research. Next, in the (3) Results, the identified 
aspects in the first chapter will be researched in the reality of the European Union, 
consisting out of four parts: (3.1) European integration; (3.2) Basic democratic values 
and principles; (3.3) The Charter of Fundamental Rights; (3.4) Upholding EU values. 
Subsequently, in the (4) Discussion, an analysis of the results of the empirical part and 
the literature review will be conducted, followed by the (5) Conclusion.  
Limitations 
In the preliminary stages, there was an interest to study the formation of public 
reason in the discussion of migration and asylum policy of the European Union. 
Looking at the fact that the EU has been in a political deadlock since 2015 in this area, 
the area of freedom, security and justice is one of the latest policy areas, and a policy 
area that would naturally go against the instinct of a (nation) state, as territorial integrity 
is considered one of the main characteristics of a national government. Even though 
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the data on the proposals for regulation with the search filter on migration through the 
EUR-Lex database, supplemented with detailed information retrieved from the 
Legislative Observatory tool offered by the European Parliament was gathered and 
prepared for analysis, there appeared to be a need to take a step back and consider the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The need to look at the CFR 
was motivated by the fact that the legal basis of the AFSJ has been built on the Charter 
as well. Therefore, during this stage, there was referred back to the Charter, resulting 
in the identification of the Strategies on its implementation. Consequently, it appeared 
that there were only two strategies published on its implementation since it acquired a 
legally binding status in 2009. Thus, the decision was made to compare these two 
strategies to unravel the recontextualization and reinterpretation of the goals that were 
formulated for the implementation of the Charter in and by the European Union. 
Consequently, the initial intention to analyse the aforementioned data on proposals for 
regulation, that had already been gathered and processed, was abandoned. As a result, 
through a snow-ball effect, the decision was made to determine the actual use of 
existing EU mechanisms for the enforcement of fundamental rights. At first, there was 
an interest in the identification of narrative creation through the voice of the people: 
the European Parliament. The decision was made to analyse the newsroom on the EP 
website, however, the website appeared to be not fit for analysis; limited search 
options, inability to download results list or to see the total amount of search results. 
Efforts were taken to find a different database of news articles and press releases. Next, 
the common database of the EU appeared to only offer in-depth search options for the 
last 30 days; all items older than 30 days would be available at the database of the 
individual institution. However, the link offered referred to the newsroom of the EP, 
the one that led to the need to find another database due to the lack of search options 
and transparent gathering of data, in the first place. The attempts taken to gain access 
to the news items and press releases in a transparent way turned out unsuccessfully. 
Nevertheless, the option was given to request specific information, by sending an email 
to the European Parliament. Consequently, the decision was consciously taken to not 
request the information from the EP for two primary reasons: it would not be 
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conforming transparency and accessibility standards; the data that could be obtained, 
would be selected for the applicant, and not by the applicant. This would mean that, 
there would not be a way in which the objectivity of the selection of the items that 
would be delivered, could be guaranteed. On that account, the decision was made to 
further examine other mechanisms that could be utilised to uphold EU values, i.e., the 
compliance with EU law, in the same areas that were previously identified. Finally, the 
need for the integration of a third-person was expected to be determined in the analysis 




1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In this dissertation, there is looked at European governmentality and the 
formation of public reason. Governmentality offers us a broader and more abstract 
understanding of government, enabling the visualisation of implicit mechanisms used 
in establishing, developing and/or maintaining normative standards of behaviour. 
Governmentality is not a concept with a fixed definition, its tools are expected to differ 
in each situation. The core values, on which argumentation would be based remain the 
same, but the interpretation of those values would be different, as everyone interpreting 
values, does so from their own frame of reference. Therefore, there will be looked at 
different manners to utilise the concept of governmentality in the context of the 
European Union. Governmentality as a form of rule is not limited to the conception of 
the state and government, instead, attention is paid to the ways in which rule is made 
possible. In the second sub-chapter of this part, a theoretical study of public reason will 
be conducted.  
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One of the key elements of governmentality is concerned with ‘conduct’;  
 
“Conduct is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, but it is 
equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be conducted (se laisse 
conduire), and finally, in which one behaves (se comporter) under the influence of a conduct as the 
action of conducting or of conduction (conduction)”  
(Foucault (1978), 2007, pp. 257-258). 
 
The concept of governmentality as introduced by Foucault in the 70s, combines 
two terms: government and mentality. As discussed in the introduction, in accordance 
with Foucault his conception (1978, 2007), governmentality has three meanings: A 
complex ensemble of structures; A tendency, A type of power; A result of a process.  
Building further on studies that aimed to utilise Foucault his conception of 
governmentality, governmentality could be understood in a way that it expands the 
narrow scope of a definition of government; a concept of power and way of governing 
that is determined by the rationalities/mentalities behind the structures of power in 
place. The normative construction of governance would lead to the development of a 
frame of reference for the conduct of conduct, cultivated with the use of framing and 
narrative construction. In turn, behaviour of individuals is regulated through the 
creation of general norms and corresponding concepts, justified through argumentation 
and appealing to values. The tools used in the regulation of behaviour are also referred 
to as micro-practices and technologies. In this understanding, governing concerns “the 
conduct of conduct”, in which the normative standard would be reflected in specific 
governmental apparatuses and knowledges; encompassing all mechanisms that aim to 
“shape, guide, manage or regulate the conduct of persons- in light of certain principles 
or goals” (Rose, 1996, p. 41 in Glenn, 2019, p. 26).  
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The study of governmentality can be applied in a wide range of areas, from 
sociology, criminology, economic and social geography, urban studies, cultural studies 
and financial management (Walters & Haahr, 2005). Governmentality is believed to 
offer powerful analytical tools for the study of politics. According to Walters & Haahr, 
it would be unwise, and even inappropriate, to over-rationalise ‘governmentality’ by 
turning it into a theory of power. Instead, the authors suggest considering the analytical 
dimensions offered by governmentality. On that note, in accordance with the categories 
offered by Walters & Haahr (2005), there are at least three ways in which 
governmentality could be understood: 
1. The conduct of conduct (Walters & Haahr, 2005). In this understanding, the 
activity of governing is concerned with shaping, guiding, regulating the conduct of 
a person. Governing takes place through the regulated freedoms of individuals and 
collectives (Walters & Haahr, 2005). The term governmentality enables the 
understanding of government in a more abstract way; a broad range of practices 
visible in different aspects of life, often contradictory and only partly coordinated. 
Therefore, a government would not be defined as an institution or a structure, rather 
as a set of activities, shaping the conduct of conduct. According to Tully (1999), the 
work of Foucault on governmentality finds common ground with Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, Arendt and Skinner, on at least one aspect; focusing on the activity or 
the game of politics itself (In Walters & Haahr, 2005). 
2. A form of political analysis (Walters & Haahr, 2005). In this aspect, the focus 
would be laid on “mentality”, stimulating a critical and reflexive form of political 
analysis; unravelling the forms of political reason and ethical assumptions behind 
the political thought that informs the conduct of conduct. There is a shift in the 
territory of governance, what is called by Rose; governing through community 
(1996, 1999 in Walters & Haahr, 2005). Constructivists tends to focus on causal 
explanations, emphasizing the need to study ideas, constructions, norms; elements 
that are often overlooked in institutional or rational approaches. Governmentality 
does not aim to offer causal explanations, instead; “If it exhibits an interest in 
discourse, this is less for the reason of factoring it in as one more explanatory 
4 
 
variable but instead denaturalising many of the terms that we might otherwise take 
for granted. Making these terms stand out, making them less familiar, is a necessary 
precondition for thinking and acting otherwise” (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p. 291). 
Finally, the utilisation of governmentality enables the theorization of changing the 
typology of politics. 
3. A historically specific form of power (Walters & Haahr, 2005). Thirdly, there 
could be looked at characterisations of changes in and/or transformations of the 
nature, logic, means and ends of political rule (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p. 291). 
Next, governmentality, as a mode of power, could be understood, in a similar 
fashion as modes of production, such as communism, feudalism, capitalism. In 
addition, the nature of governmentality, as an art of governance, would offer the 
possibility to perceive a system in the same manner as capitalism as a system; the 
dominant mode of production (power). 
Different aspects of governance are covered by the concept of governmentality; 
vocabulary of the state, forms of subjectivity, and forms of socialisation (mechanisms). 
Vocabulary of the state is concerned with the genealogy of political thought and 
rationalities: vocabulary, conceptualisation and articulation of rule. In the process of 
governing, specific techniques are employed to present problems as understandable 
and amenable. In addition, discourse could be utilised as an intellectual machinery 
establishing the main frame in situation x, making it amenable to political deliberations 
(Glenn, 2019, p. 26). The second aspect is concerned with the forms of subjectivity 
flowing out of the first aspect, as well as forms of socialisation employed in shaping 
and regulating the conduct of the individual. Forms of subjectivity are not determined 
by the regime, but are implicitly formed by setting standards, promoting certain 
normative standards of beliefs, values, norms and forms of behaviour (Glenn, 2019). 
Moreover, Merlingen (2003) stated that, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) 
function as a legitimate representative of the dominant collective. Normative power of 
IGOs is believed to be derived from self-identification of group members with the 
collective (Merlingen, 2003). 
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Furthermore, Toplišek (2019) employed multiple approaches in researching 
liberal democracies in crisis through the lens of governmentality. Crisis has been used 
as an analytical framework, with a focus on how the conditions of crisis change through 
discursive discourse. Next, political economy served as the basis of the general 
approach, with the aim to identify structural and historical conditions for the 
depoliticization of contemporary democratic politics. In a macro-level analysis, 
signifiers or interpretive categories constituting judgements made in times of crisis 
should be identified. Apart from that, during crises, critical reasoning- so-called 
discourse of truth is required to renew old ways of reasoning (Toplišek, 2019, p. 77). 
Framing an event as a crisis takes place through the construction of narratives. As stated 
by Toplišek, narratives are politically conditioned, and are constructed with a 
predetermined function, serving interests of specific structures. In addition, psycho-
analytics could be employed to research micro-level impacts of crisis or trauma on the 
subjective and objective realities of individuals (Toplišek, 2019). 
According to Derous & de Roeck (2019), the interrelation of different forms of 
power in the sui generis of international organizations could be researched with the use 
of governmentality. The utility of governmentality has been researched in the study of 
EU external relations. In doing so, the concept could be divided into three parts: (1) 
Definition of government; (2) Overarching discursive constructions or mentalities; (3) 
Translation of mentalities into micro-practices/technologies of governing (Derous et 
al., 2019, p. 247). Government is understood as an umbrella of discursive 
constructions/mentalities, translated to reality through technologies or mechanisms 
employed by the government, shaping the conduct of conduct. Governmentality is in 
constant interplay of construction and techniques, reflecting the dominant political 
mentalities and governance techniques. Moreover, Derous & de Roeck (2019), created 
four analytical dimensions to inspire future research concerned with governmentality 
analysis (Appendix 1, Figure 1). If governmentality would be analysed in a micro-
setting, attention could be paid to the interdependence of power, freedom and 
resistance. Finally, in the work of Derous & de Roeck, the recommendation has been 
made to incorporate the following methods in analysis; historical analysis, power 
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effects in discursive and technical aspects of governance, framing and discourse 
analysis, the role of counter-conduct as part of governance. At the methodological 
level, the focus is often laid on discourse analysis of policy papers, official 
publications, legal texts, speeches, to unveil the discursive construction of problems, 
corresponding arguments, justifications and strategies. In addition, there could be made 
use of charts, tables and graphs to demonstrate how a specific issue is visualised as 
governable and manageable (Zimmerman & Favell, 2011). 
Apart from that, there could be looked at the process of depoliticization of 
concepts related to the issue that is being studied. Muehlenhoff (2019), questioned the 
claim that depoliticization is undesirable and broadened the scope of the political in 
governmentality literature by building on insights derived from feminist and queer 
international relations theory. Presenting an issue as technical and manageable could 
result in its depoliticization. The feminist approach enables the expansion of the narrow 
scope of interpretation of governmentality by recognizing the overlapping and 
interacting nature of the private and public sphere, and enables the study of civil society 
organizations and empowerment (Muehlenhoff, 2019). 
However, the statement made by Muehlenhoff about the narrow interpretation 
of governmentality, and the utility of incorporating perspectives offered by feminist 
and queer international relations theory, allowing for the study of civil society 
organisations and empowerment, would not change the interpretation of 
governmentality. This can be observed in the fact that Foucault (1978), extensively 
discussed the role of the population in guiding the state, where Foucault recognized the 
role of civil society as a natural process that should not be strictly governed by the 
state. Nevertheless, as the intentions of Muehlenhoff are good, the argument made 
about widening the narrow scope of governmentality is out of place; April 5 1978, 
Foucault posed the question; “What is civil society if not, precisely, something that 
cannot be thought of as simply the product and result of the state? But neither is it 
something like man’s natural existence. Civil society is what governmental thought, 
the new form of governmentality born in the eighteenth century, reveals as the 
necessary correlate of the state” (Foucault 1978, 2007, p. 449). In turn, Foucault raised 
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the following questions, “With what must the state concern itself? For what must the 
state be responsible? What must it know? What must the state, if not control, at least 
regulate, or what kind of thing is it whose natural regulations it must respect?” 
(Foucault 1978, 2007, p. 449).  
Furthermore, Shore (2011), analysed the genealogy of European governance and 
concluded that the model employed by the European Commission represents a form of 
neoliberal governmentality. In his research, three political and sociological questions 
were posed: differences between European governance and government; the new 
semantic (political) terrain created by the discourse related to the EC’s interpretation 
of EU governance; policy shifts, and reconceptualization of the EU by European policy 
elites related to the appropriation of the concept of governance. The results have shown 
that a normative definition of governance, promoting an EU-centric view, an open and 
pluralistic political arrangement, including multi-level organisations, has been 
constructed by the European Commission. According to Shore (2011), modern 
statecraft is focused on “steering”, rather than commanding and controlling. This type 
of governance could be perceived as inclusive and representative of all EU 
stakeholders, fostering democracy and accountability. At the same time, the craft of 
steering could be considered less democratic due to the lack of inclusiveness and 
participation in the nature of the term. An organic democracy is based on informal 
instruments of regulation and self-regulation, informed by the rule of experts and new 
public management techniques (Shore, 2011, p. 301). Lastly, Shore (2011) found EU 
governmentality to be depoliticizing, acting as an “anti-politics machine” (p. 303). 
Moreover, İşleyen (2015), researched the EU Twinning programs through the 
lens of governmentality. The results have shown that the effects of the Twinning 
programs go beyond the original agenda and intentions. İşleyen (2015), employed 
Dean’s analytics of government to examine how EU-instruments function. Deans’ 
analytics of government consists out of three fields: (1) visualization of government; 
(2) technical aspect of government; (3) “the formation of subjects, selves, persons, 
actors and agents” (Dean (2008) p. 32 in İşleyen, 2015, p. 677). The aforementioned 
methodology provides the opportunity to apply Foucault’s core ideas in analysing case 
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studies under scrutiny. The first field frames the problem sphere, in connection with 
economic and social growth. Furthermore, the employment of benchmarking strategies 
demonstrates that there has been a shift from the act of governing towards the conduct 
of business. In the work of İşleyen, there has been made use of primary and secondary 
sources; primary resources such as country strategy papers, manuals, annual reports, 
news, evaluation reports and EC documents; secondary sources have been consulted to 
establish a contextual basis of EU engagement in the region.  
The study on governmentality offers insights into how the ideas behind power 
structures in place could be constructed, and its implications on the self-governance of 
others, as well as in what way power structures beyond the nation state could be 
analysed. The next topic to be looked at is the formation of public reason in and beyond 
the nation state, based on the works of Rawls (1997), Habermas (1995), Sadurski 
(2015), Petersmann (2008), Douglass-Scott (2011), Kjaer (2017), Crum (2017), 
supplemented with books and studies on, e.g., the European Union, European 
citizenship, European civil society, European values, justice and human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law. 
The aim of the theoretical study of public reason in the European Union is 
twofold: 
1. Determine the basis of public reason in governmentality of and beyond the 
nation state 
2. Unpack the role of democratic principles, values and basic rights in the 









Dimensions belonging to the accountability of EU governance can only be fully 
understood by introducing public reason to the research of it, looking at the political 
values through institutional embodiment (Weale, 2011). In this chapter, a theoretical 
study of public reason in the European Union will be conducted, starting with a further 
elaboration on the original idea of public reason as introduced by Rawls, and remarks 
and suggestions made by Habermas.  
The idea of public reason originates from the theory of justice in the work of 
John Rawls, one of the most known political philosophers in this area. Rawls renewed 
the approach taken by Kant, concerning the question of morality, by introducing an 
intersubjectivist version of the principle of autonomy; humans act autonomously and 
obey laws based on the assumption that, through the public use of reason, it would be 
accepted by all (Habermas, 1995). The underlying foundation of public reason is the 
theory of justice; “justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a 
greater good shared by others” (Rawls, 1971, 1999, p. 3). The idea of public reason 
indicates that citizens would accept decisions when the outcome is perceived as most 
reasonable for all, free and equal citizens; the outcomes of the deliberation of 
democratic processes secures the public through reason. In unfolding the idea of public 
reason, it is necessary to identify the basic moral and political values that constitute the 
relations between a constitutional democratic government and her citizens (Rawls, 
1997). It is important to outline that the idea of public reason2 can only be applied, but 
never in the same way, to political discussions of fundamental questions in the public 
 
2 The idea of public reason has a definite structure consisting out of five key elements: “1. The fundamental 
political question to which it applies; 2. The persons to whom it applies (government officials and candidates for public 
office); 3. Its content as given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; 4. The application of these 
conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people; 5. 
Citizens' checking that the principles derived from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity” (Rawls, 
1997, p. 767). 
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political forum3  (Rawls, 1997). Persons participating in the public political forum 
reason from the original position, which takes place behind the veil of ignorance. And 
if one or more elements included in the definite structure of the idea of public reason 
would be ignored, the idea itself would become far-fetched. Justice as fairness serves 
as the foundation for overlapping consensus, and is expected to succeed under the 
conditions existing in a pluralistic society (Rawls in Habermas, 1995). Furthermore 
Rawls (1997) stated that, political principles and guidelines can be identified by 
demonstrating that those conceptions would be agreed to in the original position. Apart 
from that, Rawls acknowledged that others may think that different ways to identify 
these principles would be more reasonable. Therefore, the content of public reason is 
provided for by a family of political conceptions of justice, of which justice as fairness 
is but one. On that note, Rawls (1997) proposed three main features characterizing 
these conceptions: first of all, there should be a list of basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities (e.g., those familiar from constitutional regimes); second, special priority 
should be given to these rights, liberties and opportunities; third, it should be 
measurable for citizens to make effective use of their freedoms (p. 774). Nevertheless, 
the interpretation of these ideas would lead to different formulations of the principles 
of justice and contents of public reason. Even if the same political conceptions would 
be specified, there would be a difference in the way in which political principles and 
values would be balanced. In addition, Rawls (1997), assumed that, what he refers to 
as, ‘these liberalisms’ cover more than procedural justice as they contain substantive 
principles of justice. 
As observed by Habermas (1995), the operationalisation of the moral point of 
view by Rawls leads to several unfortunate consequences; “1. Can the parties in the 
original position comprehend the highest-order interest of their clients solely on the 
 
3 Public political forum: 1. The discourse of judges in decisions; 2. The discourse of government officials; 3. 
The discourse of politicians and their campaign managers (p. 767). The culture of civil society, referred to as the 
background culture, is separate and distinct from the public political forum- the idea of public reason does not apply to 
the background culture. 
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basis of rational egoism?; 2. Can basic rights be assimilated to primary goods?; 3. Does 
the veil of ignorance guarantee the impartiality of judgment?” (1995, p. 112).  
According to Habermas (1995), in the original conception (Rawls), the freedom 
of choice of rational actors has been placed in the frame of the theory of justice, as part 
of the general theory of choice; assuming that “the range of options open to rationally 
choosing parties only needed to be limited in an appropriate fashion in order to 
facilitate the derivation of principles of justice from their enlightened self-interest” 
(Habermas, 1995, p. 111). Habermas continued that, Rawls soon realised that, “the 
reason of autonomous citizens cannot be reduced to rational choice conditioned by 
subjective preferences” (Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, xi (Summer 1985): 223-51, p. 237 n. 20, in Habermas, 1995, p. 
113). 
Citizens. Moral persons possessing a sense of justice, the capacity to have their 
own conception of the good, and the interest in organising this in a rational manner. 
Those engaged in reasoning from the original position, do so within the constraints of 
a rational design, behind the veil of ignorance. This position would ideally guarantee 
that decisions are taken in an impartial manner. In the understanding of Rawls, 
characteristics of a moral person are not included in the original position. At the same 
time, actors reasoning from the original position are expected to understand autonomy 
as possessed by a citizen, without possessing it themselves (In Habermas, 1995). In 
addition, concerns have been expressed with regards to the possible influence of the 
perspective of rational egoists on the meaning of justice. Whatever the case may be, 
the capacity of actors reasoning from the original position has been described as 
restricted by the limits of their “rational egoism”, therefore, there has been stated that 
those actors would not be able to adopt the reciprocal perspective- the perspective 
citizens are expected to adopt in fulfilling their duty of civility- that is deemed 
necessary to do what is equally good for all. In contrast to Rawls, Habermas (1995) 
pointed out that, if parties would be expected to understand the meaning of the 
deontological principles striven for in accounting for their clients’ interests in justice, 
it is necessary to ensure that their cognitive competences “extend further than the 
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capacities sufficient for rationally choosing actors who are blind to issues of justice” 
(p. 113). Those reasoning on behalf of citizens have been described as rational 
decision-makers, who are detached from the moral person. Next, Habermas questioned 
if the design of the original position was a wise one; rationally choosing actors have 
been described to be bound to the first-person position; normative issues can only be 
evaluated in relation with interests or values that are provided for by goods. According 
to Habermas (1995), the concept of justice adopted by Rawls is more in line with the 
ethics of approaches instead of a theory of rights. In accordance with Rawls’ 
conception of justice, the autonomy of citizens is derived from their rights, while rights 
could only be enjoyed by exercising them. However, Habermas argues that, if rights 
would be assimilated to distributive goods, their deontological meaning would become 
spoiled; the rational choice model is conceptually constrained. According to Habermas 
(1995), criticism on Rawls’ conception of public reason can be met through the creation 
of a subsequent qualification of primary goods, establishing a relation to basic liberties 
as basic rights. However, this would indicate that there would be a deontological 
distinction between  rights and goods, which contradicts the prima facie classification 
of rights as goods (Habermas, 1995). Moreover, in order to ensure the fair value of 
equal liberties, the actual availability of opportunities needs to be addressed; only in 
the case of rights, there could be distinguished between legal competence and the actual 
opportunity available to choose and act (Habermas, 1995). And this would indicate that 
the notion of primary goods would be subject to correction in a second step, which is 
why Habermas (1995) posed the question whether the design of the original position, 
that resulted in the need to offer additional differentiations in the interpretation of rights 
as primary goods, was a wise one. Next, Habermas (1995) raised the question why 
parties would be deprived of practical reason, located behind the veil of ignorance, and 
argued that the problematics arising with the design of the original position could be 
overcome by operationalising the moral point of view in a different manner.  
The manner in which this moral point of view should be operationalised, is to 
keep the procedural conception of practical reasoning free of substantive connotations 
by developing it in a procedural manner (Habermas, 1995). The outcome of a Kantian 
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universally valid worldview would only take place in case the self-understanding of 
individuals would reflect an a priori consciousness, leading to an outcome that would 
be equally good for and in the equal interest of all. Simultaneously, there has been 
pointed out that this fact can no longer be assumed under the conditions of social and 
ideological pluralism, but, if the spirit of the Kantian universalisation principle is to be 
preserved, there could be responded to the aforementioned situation in different ways 
(Habermas, 1995). On that note, Habermas (1995) proposed to consider discourse 
ethics- the intersubjective practice of argumentation, enabling those involved to 
broaden the horizon of their interpretive perspectives, is the practice in which the moral 
point of view would be embodied. Discourse ethics would call for a joint process of 
ideal role taking (if the application of universalisation is properly understood). In 
addition, Habermas (1995) referred to the pragmatic theory of argumentation; an 
inclusive and non-coercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, a 
process in which everyone is required to adopt the perspective of everyone else, 
projecting herself into the understanding of the self and world of others. The 
aforementioned ideal would lead to the interlocking of different perspectives, resulting 
in the formation of a we-perspective. And from this perspective, all can test whether to 
adopt a controversial norm as the basis of their shared practice. In this process, mutual 
criticism of the appropriateness of the language used in terms of the situations are 
defined and needs would be interpreted. Finally, “in the course of successively 
undertaken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can emerge step by step” 
(Habermas, 1995, p. 118). 
The veil of ignorance. In accordance with the justification of the principles of 
justice, the veil of ignorance would be lifted gradually in the process of framing a 
constitution, legislation and the application of law. On that note, Habermas (1995) 
pointed out that, new information flowing out of the aforementioned aspect must be in 
line with the basic principles selected under the veil of ignorance, to avoid unpleasant 
surprises. According to Habermas (1995), to ensure the harmonization of new 
information flows with previously established concepts, the original position should be 
constructed with knowledge and foresights of all the normative aspects that could 
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cultivate a shared self-understanding of free and equal citizens. Therefore, the 
impartiality of judgment could only be guaranteed if basic normative concepts utilised 
in its construction, would be resilient to revision “in light of morally significant future 
experiences and learning processes” (Habermas, 1995, p. 118). Depriving information 
imposed on those in the original position by the veil of ignorance is a heavy burden of 
proof to carry. In turn, Habermas (1995), suggest a convenient response to decrease 
this burden, by operationalizing the moral point of view through a more open procedure 
of argumentative practice under the public use of reason, without categorising the 
pluralism of perspectives and worldviews beforehand.  
In the previous paragraphs, a basic understanding of Rawls’ conception of public 
reason through political liberalism, as well as Habermas’ objections and suggestions 
have been discussed. In the following part, articles on public reason in a multi-level 
governance and supranational context will be discussed. At the same time, a further 
elaboration on interpretations of Rawls and Habermas will be outlined. Consequently, 
key concepts to be determined will be supplemented with studies, books and articles in 
the context of the European Union. 
1.2.1 Multi-level governance and supranationalism 
 “We assume the capacity of reason to be universal and public reason to thicken with 
the increase of mutual interaction” (Crum, 2017, p. 53). 
In the theory of justice, subjects of public reason are not individuals but 
collectives, their representatives; people are those who have several elements in 
common: a political structure, culture and a political conception of justice (Crum, 2017, 
p. 48). As a result of the increasing interdependence between states, elements of public 
reason do no longer solely rely on “the negative common good of averting conflict and 
war”; a shift has been noted towards more positive common goods (Crum, 2017, p. 
50). Furthermore, Crum (2017) differentiated between “thin” and “thick” public 
reason. At the domestic level people have the opportunity to make “thicker” use of 
public reason and to develop a common conception of justice of what should happen 
at the international stage. The main difference between the domestic and the 
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international domain is the political autonomy of citizens. This autonomy is realized at 
the domestic level under “thick” public reason; therefore, there has been argued that, 
public reason at the international level is much “thinner”.  The first factor determining 
the foundation and thickness of public reason at the domestic domain consists out of 
the historical functions of the nation state. In this sense, the nation state has a special 
position within the multi-layered structure of public reason. The nation state entails 
five principles: strong external borders; state apparatus; monolingualism; national mass 
media; national party structure. Levels of political obligations resulting in the exercise 
of collective political autonomy are determined by the state. The scope of 
consequences ruled through justice is determined by the extent to which the existing 
shared framework of political deliberation enables its justification. In addition, the 
level of involvement and public reason depend on the scope and depth of political 
obligations. The EU is taken as an example to demonstrate that with 
internationalisation, public reason flows across national borders; the scope of public 
reason has been expanding with the conferral of competences to the European level, 
the degree of EU integration and the spill-over effects of policy area deepen the level 
of cooperation and add new competences to its foundation. In turn, the scope of public 
reason is widened, and nation states are enabled to incorporate positions of other nation 
states at the domestic level of reasoning (Crum, 2017). At the same time, the process 
of autonomisation of international organisations could result in a legitimacy gap 
between domestic levels and the supranational level. According to Sadurski (2015), 
this gap can be largely bridged by appealing to public reason. The level of 
autonomisation increases with (1) the interpretation of legal sources establishing the 
authority of an organisation; (2) a wide range of mechanisms that cannot only be used 
by governments, but by individuals and NGOs as well; (3) the integration of 
supranational law into domestic law, the expansion of legal precedents by international 
courts and tribunals; (4) the establishment of key terms by judicial authorities 
independently of value added to those concepts by local legal systems (Sadurski, 2015). 
Consequently, the scope of an organisation is no longer determined by member states 
only, and, in this context, not only the characteristics and scope of an organisation 
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change, but the level of self-identification of people part of this supranational collective 
as well. As a result, the scope of public reason beyond the nation state has been steadily 
expanding; transnational relations allow for public reason to evolve, resulting in a shift 
in the grounds and scope of political obligations (Crum, 2017).  Therefore, sharing a 
common understanding of beliefs and values becomes increasingly important under a 
common political structure. Common standards of reasoning are created through 
mutual engagement in public deliberation about shared norms and values (Crum, 
2017). 
1.2.2 Basic democratic values and citizenship 
In determining the foundation on which the idea of public reason would be 
based, it is necessary to consider the establishment of basic democratic values in a 
constitution; basic democratic values, as well as democratic citizenship are considered 
key elements in unfolding the idea of public reason that determines the relationship 
between a constitutional democratic government and her citizens (Habermas, 1995). In 
a deliberative democracy, there should be an idea of public reason, a framework 
specifying the setting for deliberative legislative bodies through constitutional 
democratic institutions, and citizens should possess the need and corresponding 
knowledge to fulfil the duty of civility (Rawls, 1997). Reasonable pluralism is a basic 
feature of democracy, the natural outcome of a culture with free institutions is the 
presence of diverse conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious, 
philosophical, moral). The coexistence of comprehensive doctrines aims to 
demonstrate that each party could endorse a reasonable political conception, and 
through conjecture, and despite different understandings of groups, would be able to 
adopt the basis for public reasons (Rawls, 1997, p. 786). Public representatives in 
liberal democracies “agree” on serving the will of the people, based on two points 
leading to mutual agreement: everyone enjoys and has access to a system of basic 
liberties; “social inequalities are acceptable only when they are also to the advantage 
of the least privileged” (Rawls in Habermas, 1995, p. 110). The aforementioned points, 
as proposed by Rawls, and discussed by Habermas, indicate that this conception of 
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justice would be expected to meet in agreement “under those conditions of a pluralistic 
society which it itself promotes” (Rawls in Habermas, 1995, p. 110). Furthermore, 
Habermas elaborated that, political liberalism would not claim a position towards truth, 
as it promotes itself as being neutral towards conflicting worldviews. 
Political conceptions of justice as a basis for public reason. Liberal political 
principles and values are derived from liberal political conceptions of justice. 
According to Rawls (1997), political conceptions of justice apply to political and social 
institutions4; are the same for all comprehensive doctrines (reasonable overlapping 
consensus may exist); are implicit fundamental ideas in public political culture (Rawls, 
1997, p. 776). Next to that, each political conception should include principles, 
standards, ideals, guidelines of inquiry. Engaging in public reason can take place when 
individuals appeal to one of the existing political conceptions, and from this 
framework, engage in debates about fundamental political questions. Political 
conceptions relevant for public reason are those conceptions that are reasonable for a 
constitutional democratic regime. On the other hand, Habermas (1995) pointed out that, 
by calling a conception of justice political, Rawls’ seemed to break down the 
distinction between its justified acceptability and actual acceptance, Rawls; “the aim 
of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or 
epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but 
one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between 
citizens viewed as free and equal persons” (Justice as Fairness: Political Not 
Metaphysical, p. 230 in Habermas, 1995, p. 122). According to Habermas (1995), a 
clear distinction between acceptability and acceptance should be made; if Rawls 
excludes a functionalist interpretation of justice as fairness, there should be allowed for 
some epistemic relation between “the validity of his theory and the prospects of its 
neutrality toward competing worldviews”, that are confirmed in public discourses (p, 
122). 
 
4 Political values are reflected in and realized by political institutions. There should be differentiated between 
basic values of public reason and other values reflected in political institutions or political parties (Rawls, 1997). 
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 Moreover, Habermas (1995), explained that each concept within the “network 
of concepts in which persons and interpersonal relations, actors and actions, norm 
conforming and deviant behaviour, responsibility and autonomy, and even 
intersubjectively structured moral feelings all find their place”, deserves a prior 
analysis (p. 127). 
The principles counting for the notion of the public use of reason are valid if met 
with “uncoerced intersubjective recognition under conditions of rational discourse” 
(Habermas, 1995, p. 127). This leaves space in empirical questions to determine when 
and whether “valid principles” could guarantee political stability within a pluralistic 
society. Habermas (1995) argued that, under the veil of ignorance, an increase in 
awareness of citizens will lead to the discovering that one has been subject to principles 
and norms institutionalized beyond their control. In the theory of justice, there has been 
argued that the establishment of a democratic constitution can only happen once, and 
that it is not possible to repeat this under the constraints developed by the institutional 
conditions of a society which had already been constituted.. New developments are 
ought to be constructed conforming the normative concepts in the existing 
understanding of the public; basic principles should be harmonized to avoid 
“unpleasant surprises” (Habermas, 1995, p. 118). The “public5 use of reason” sets 
unrealistic demands in discovering the original position; therefore, Habermas (1995) is 
in favour of employing the open procedure of argumentative practice.  
Harmonizing basic principles in the EU 
The core political values of the EU have been outlined in Treaties, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), as well as the Copenhagen 
Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria6 (1993) serves to guarantee that new Member States 
meet a set criteria of democratic principles and economic standards. As pointed out by 
 
5 Reason is public in three ways: reason of free and equal citizens; the subject of reasoning concerns public 
goods, looking at fundamental political justice (constitutional essence and matters of basic justice); expressed by “a family 
of reasonable conceptions of political justice” (Rawls, 1997, p. 767). 
6 “[A] functioning market economy; stable institutions guaranteeing democracy and a market economy, human 
rights and respect for and the protection of minority rights; and the ability to implement the acquis Communautaire” 
(European Council, 1993, p. 13 in Teti et al., 2020, p. 43). 
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Oxelheim et al (2020), the lack of sufficient political support for a number of EU 
values, as laid down in the Treaties, makes it unattainable to translate the values into 
legally binding protective mechanisms. At the same time, perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the EU are linked to its raison d’être as a global actor; the increasing scrutiny on EU 
internal and external policy results in the need for the EU to pay special attention to its 
communication and protection of fundamental rights and values. In this aspect, 
European integration entered the era in which the safeguarding of liberal democracies 
in Europe obtained a key role in determining the future of Europe (Oxelheim, 2020). 
One of the few existing mechanisms to enforce the compliance with fundamental 
values in the EU is offered by Article 7 from the Treaty on the European Union, and 
could be enforced when there is (risk of) a serious breach, or a repetitive breach, of the 
values laid down in Art. 2 (TEU). The breach of values referred to in Article 2 would 
be determined by the European Council, based on unanimity; this is where the 
enforcement of corresponding “punishments” (suspension of voting rights) is blocked. 
Considering the approach in monitoring compliance with fundamental values, the role 
of the European Commission in the new framework demonstrates that there has been 
a shift from an intergovernmental logic to a supranational one (Moberg, 2020).  
In the beginning of the 21st Century, efforts were taken to establish a constitution 
for Europe. The constitution was never ratified, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the 
Reform Treaty, is considered to entail key elements that were established in the 
discussions on a constitution. In the process of European integration, the structure of 
the Union has been adjusted to the increase accountability, legitimacy, transparency, 
and democracy (Högenauer, Neuhold & Christiansen, 2016). 
The role of norms and values 
In the work of Hermerén (2008), European values have been researched in the 
context of a political and ethical construct; discussing ‘European values’ instead of 
‘values in Europe’ is not necessarily a political rhetoric. Common values could be 
emphasized to generate political, social and economic gains, and could function as a 
mechanism to generate a sense of unity between the Member States. Next, there has 
been argued that norms and values play a crucial role in holding a union of states 
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together, and that shared values inform the moral identity of a society (Hermerén, 
2008). In addition, Hermerén (2008), pointed out that trade-offs between values take 
place in all societies; the practice of ranking values on importance in case of a value 
clash, leads to redefinitions, interpretations and clarifications in decision-making. At 
the same time, Hermerén (2008), stated that, moves made in the aforementioned 
situation are not considered ethically neutral. Therefore, the author argued that there 
are “several different ranking orders of values depending on context, situation and 
problem (Hermerén, 2008, p. 379).  
Furthermore, Kjaer (2017), noted a reconfiguration between normative and 
cognitive articulations and expectations; norms play an important role in organising 
societal processes with strong cognitive components. In the exercise of power of 
democratic states, the former and the latter are combined, allowing for norms to support 
adaptivity to change. As soon as normative outlooks become part of legal principles, 
these norms obtain an indirect strategic role and become tools guiding decision-making 
processes. Next to that, normative expectations could obtain a constitutional status, 
e.g., the creation of “an ever-closer Union” (EU). In the process of justification, 
legitimacy-enhancing measures are employed by structures of public power. In the EU, 
there are general frameworks of policymaking, consultation, feedback mechanisms. 
However, Kjaer (2017) argued that, due to the fact that the EC itself selects 
stakeholders to be consulted in decision-making, these frameworks turn into a stage 
revolving around the self-representation of the EC. Simultaneously, policymaking 
frameworks could lead to an increase of the cognitive capacities of the EC, in which 
societal developments inform policymaking. Nevertheless, Kjaer (2017), argued that, 
relying on strong abstract normative principles seems far-fetched in the case of the EU, 
therefore, policymaking frameworks would turn into aesthetic forms, that lack strong 
substance and significant normative guidance. 
Union citizenship 
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established the concept of European identity 
and Union citizenship. The development of European citizenship could be considered 
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as a driving force in the creation of a political community, in which citizens become 
part of a new collective, resulting in the creation of a prototype for a post-national 
citizenship design (Kostakopoulou, 2008, p. 286). Union citizenship is considered to 
be the only existing example of transnational citizenship, that was created in an attempt 
to establish a transnational political community and democracy (Siklodi, 2020). 
According to Murray (2016), with its establishment, a new ‘political’ element was 
added to the integration process of the Union.  
Related to citizenship, but with a focus on modifying and shaping feelings of 
belonging, European integration could be considered to entail an identity building 
process. In analysing this process, attention should be paid to the capacity of 
institutions to modify and shape territorial and emotional feelings of belonging to a 
specific group, community, peoples (Checkel (1999) in Bee, 2008). The concept of 
identity is often understood as something “imagined”, a dynamic, rather than static, 
concept, an integrated symbolic structure in the past, present and future. Identity is not 
entirely imagined in the case of the EU; categorisations constituting identities have 
been laid out in the Treaties (Jacobs & Maier, 1998). Throughout the years, different 
mechanisms have been established to further the process of self-identification with the 
Union. In 2007, the concept of European citizenship was strengthened as a result of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, with the European Citizens’ Initiative. The ECI turned into force in 
2012, and has been used as a method to establish direct contact between citizens and 
the European Parliament (Crespy & Parks, 2019). 
Scholars have argued that European citizenship could be understood as a 
symbolic institution, inducing real institutional change. Constructivists placed the issue 
of European citizenship in a broader context of socio-political transformations, and 
perceived existing constraints in political and legal structures as opportunities for 
institutional modification in building a political community (Kostakopoulou, 2008). In 
addition, through the lens of constructivism, identity has been perceived as the outcome 
of political manipulation, reinvention, and the selection of sets of values (Bee, 2008).  
According to Hermerén (2008), a moral identity, based on a minimum set of 
shared values, is required for the survival of a society. Identity emerges through the 
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combination of the construction of social values, norms of behaviour and collective 
symbols. Relevant for this dissertation is the statement made by Balibar (1991), “the 
dominant reference points of individual identity change over time [] with the changing 
institutional environment" (In Jacobs & Maier, 1998, p. 4). Basic elements such as 
language, race, history, culture, territory, are essential for the process of self-
identification with, and belonging to, an in-group, a community. The analytical 
framework for the study of contemporary citizenship employed by Siklodi (2020), 
encompasses three dimensions: identity [a sense of belonging; shared identity; 
recognition of the ‘other’], rights [awareness citizenship rights; access to civil, social 
and political rights; membership political community], participation [socio-economic 
background participants; models and reasons; forms of engagement] (p. 50). 
Furthermore, there has been argued that, intra-EU mobility leads to the 
redefinition of national models of citizenship in Europe, challenging the popular belief 
of citizenship being tied to statehood. Traditional notions of statehood and citizenship 
are increasingly under public scrutiny, reflected in the news and political headlines in 
the Member States. According to McMahon (2015), the free movement of CEE citizens 
has become a politicized topic of discussion (In Siklodi, 2020). Consequently, 
problematics attached to the politicization of ‘free movement’ offered ground for the 
development of populist ideas. As pointed out by Siklodi (2020), intra-EU learning 
mobility may be the only area that has not been affected by the dynamics of 
contemporary European politics. In 2008, Fejes, analysed the role of the Bologna 
Process7 (education) in the construction of a European identity. The harmonization of 
education could be understood as a way of governing and regulating behaviour; in this 
process, individuals and educational institutions are under construction. Fejes (2008), 
stated that, the EU has taken the role of an “enabling state”, whose efforts result in the 
construction of “an autonomous, self-choosing subject, which can be related to 
neoliberal governmentality” (p. 524). According to Fejes (2008), the freedoms of 
 
7 While the aim of the Bologna Process is to stimulate the free movement of Europeans, the treaty is not limited 
to EU Member States, it includes about 48 countries (Fejes, 2008). 
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citizens are the starting point in regulating and governing behaviour; governing goes 
beyond law making. In his analysis, the focus was laid on the identification of 
rationalities behind specific mechanisms. In the process of construction, a “we-group” 
is created, which consequently leads to the creation of “the other” group8.  
1.2.3 Democratic legitimacy 
Public reason strives for public justification, formulating arguments addressed 
to others, based on conclusions that oneself and others could reasonably accept this 
argument. The ideal of public reason is realised when judges, legislators, executives, 
government officials, candidates for public office act from and follow the idea of public 
reason; fulfilling their duty of civility (Rawls, 1997, p. 769). Citizens who are not 
government officials support the idea of public reason and fulfil their duty of civility 
by carrying out their moral duty, “by doing what they can to hold government officials 
to it” (Rawls, 1997, p. 769). In addition, principles of justification should be taken as a 
prerequisite for the functioning of society, that guarantee the fair cooperation of free 
and equal citizens (Habermas, 1995). Justification strives for legitimation, and the idea 
of legitimacy is based on reciprocity. According to Rawls (1997), the criterion of 
reciprocity is “violated whenever basic liberties are denied”, simultaneously, the 
criterion of reciprocity has been described as the limiting feature of different forms of 
public reason (p. 771). In this aspect, the justification of duties imposed by justice 
depends on the extent to which a shared set of reasons (possessed by those involved) 
allows for its justification. Therefore, in imposing duties of justice, the aforementioned 
aspect should be taken into consideration (Crum, 2017). In addition, there has been 
suggested that justice is constrained by the depth of public reason, while discursive 
processes of justification demonstrate that its capacity has no borders.  
The emergence of supranational and international organisations beyond the 
nation state often results in a discussion about the absence of democratic legitimacy at 
the supranational level. According to Sadurski (2015), the legitimacy of supranational 
 
8 In sociology, the former and the latter could be described as “in-group” and “out-group”. 
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actors and decisions is derived from, and relies on, their appeal to public reason. 
Supranationalism facilitates a space between national and international actors with a 
certain degree of synchronisation, where actors strive to legitimize political authority, 
based on common standards of justification and the appeal to public reason. Public 
reason is not the only factor influencing the legitimacy of authorities, other factors 
depend on the institution under consideration and could include institutional factors 
and procedural variables (Sadurski, 2015). According to Sadurski (2015), legitimacy 
is located between legal validity and justice; believed to be stronger than validity 
because it includes some level of “moral authority” on a norm, simultaneously, it is 
weaker than justice, because there could be disagreed upon the justness of a norm while 
acknowledging its legitimacy (Sadurski, 2015). Next to that, in a reason-constraining 
conception of legitimacy, there should be differentiated between (1) weak and strong 
legitimacy, (2) legitimacy of authority and that of authoritative decisions (Sadurski, 
2015, pp. 404-406). It is important to mention that, in some cases, there is no appeal to 
public reason in the public justification of a decision. A decision should be permissible 
in accordance with a forum of principle. In this case, public reason concerns “input” 
and “output” legitimacy; the former referring to factors resulting in the need for a 
decision, the latter would be necessary because the input legitimacy and consequent 
decision, cannot be separated from its substance and results (Sadurski, 2015, p. 408). 
According to Kjaer (2017), a transnational context is bounded by structural reasons, 
and only allows for a limited democracy to exist. In order to make up for existing 
limited democratic practices in a transnational context, there could be made use of 
“invoking processes of justification” (Kjaer, 2017, p. 10). Subsequently, law could 
serve as a strategic framework through which justification takes place. The EU is a 
suitable example of an institution that exercises public functions but cannot be 
categorised as a state (Kjaer, 2017). In the process of European integration, from the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the EU, the key accomplishment has 
been the reshaping of integration into a publicly organised one, in which integration 
became subject to normative standards of public law. 
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Moreover, Sadurski (2015) pointed out that, public reason could be treated as a 
legitimizing device, that appeals to values of universality, reciprocity, openness to 
cultural contexts. Due to the fact that, political legitimacy is often understood as 
democratic in nature, difficulties are created in researching political legitimacy in a 
non-state context. According to Sadurski (2015), the EU cannot be used an exemplar 
of a supranational democracy, considering the scope of competences, decision-making 
procedures, legal status of European citizenship, the Euro. Apart from that, there has 
been argued that, the democratic nature of the EU is only in its beginning stage; “the 
functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (Art. 10 (1) 
TEU). In questioning the democratic composition of the Union, Sadurski (2005) 
referred to the principle of separation of powers as well as the European Parliament; 
the only directly elected EU body, that cannot initiate legislation. Applying the concept 
of democracy at the international level would require the redefinition of the nature of 
democracy (Sadurski, 2015).  
The EU democratic deficit 
According to Oxelheim et al (2020), the empowerment of the European 
Parliament has been the main strategy to address the so-called “democratic deficit”. 
Deeper European integration is often perceived as the solution to issues faced by the 
EU. Apart from that, the issue of sovereignty plays and important role in the debate on 
the future of European integration (Ramiro Troitiño et al., 2020). Furthermore, the 
Common Assembly of the ECSC was the predecessor of the European Parliament, the 
common body of the three supranational European communities. The increasing 
powers of the European Parliament throughout the treaties could be perceived as a key 
aspect in the process of European integration (Högenauer et al., 2016). The general 
trend of liberal democracies in Europe revolves around the central role of national 
parliaments. In an effort to increase the legitimacy of the Union and to bridge the gap 
caused by the democratic deficit, a closer connection has been established between the 
work of the European Parliament and the involvement of national parliaments. In 
general, there could be spoken about an existing need for the further 
parliamentarization of the Union; some even started to speak about “the emergence of 
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a multilevel parliamentary system” in the Union (Högenauer et al., 2016, p. 2). Over 
the years, a rise in Euroscepticism, as well as “public disenchantment” has been noted 
in the EU.  
Justice in the European Union 
Moreover, Douglas-Scott (2017) argued that, there exists no overarching theory 
of justice in the EU (p. 77). The author identified “five failures of justice” in the EU; 
justice is not a specific value; it is not adequately reflected in the context of freedom, 
security and justice; it is difficult for social justice to be fulfilled under EU law; recent 
crises demonstrate a lack of EU solidarity and justice; it is impossible to identify an 
overarching concept of justice in the EU, due to its unidentifiable nature (Douglas-
Scott, 2017, p. 60). On the other hand, Petersmann (2008), pointed out that, the 
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Free 
Trade Area Court, managed to transform the intergovernmental treaties, as well as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, into “constitutional orders”. There has been 
demonstrated that the cooperation of European courts reflects overlapping consensus; 
public reason does no longer solely consists out of the reasoning of the 27 Member 
States. Petersmann (2008), argued that national and international judges could be 
perceived as “the most effective guardians of the constitutional principles and 
overlapping consensus” (p. 774). The establishment of international and European 
courts expands the constitutional rights of European citizens, the Treaties of the EU do 
not only prescribe the functioning and procedures of EU institutions and everything 
Single Market related, but offer legal remedies for European citizens, in turn, those 
legal remedies enable the watchdog function of EU citizens over the institutions. 
Petersmann (2008) concluded that judicial remedies are more efficient, effective, and 
democratically more legitimate than the politicized process of the procedures of 
settling intergovernmental disputes.  
Apart from that, the creation of legal precedents through the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, such as the Van Gend & Loos case (C-26/62), as well as the 
Costa/E.N.EL. Supremacy case, contribute to the furthering of European integration. 
In 1963, Van Gend (NL) challenged the legality of the customs duties at the Dutch 
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border when importing goods from Germany, claiming that the request to pay custom 
duties by the Dutch authorities was in contradiction with the Customs Union 
(Nowadays Art. 30 TFEU). In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
reasoned that, a ‘new legal order’ had been constituted by EU law; rights and 
obligations of private individuals and Member States were now of direct effect without 
the necessity to translate it (nowadays known as a Regulation) into national law. Three 
criteria should be met for a provision to be directly applicable: clear and precise; 
unconditional; not subject to further implementing measures (Van Munster, personal 
communication, 2018). The Van Gend & Loos case resulted in the enshrinement of 
two principles: primacy of EU law, its direct effect. The primacy of EU law and the 
majority voting rule in EU decision-making reflect the supranational character of EU 
institutions in specific areas (Moberg, 2020).  
The theoretical study on public reason results in the identification of a great 
number of elements to consider in the study of its formation in the European Union.  
1. Public deliberation about shared norms and values 
a. Common standards of justification 
b. Common standards of political legitimacy 
i. Does the existing shared framework of political deliberation allow 
for the justification of the scope of consequences ruled through 
justice? 
c. Common standards of reasoning 
2. Public reason as a legitimizing device 
a. Values, universality, reciprocity, openness to cultural contexts 
b. Redefining democracy in the EU 
c. What is the scope and depth of political obligations? 
i. Is there a shift of political obligations as a result of the 
recontextualization of basic principles? 
3. Discourse 
a. Public reason for justification – discursive resources in political contexts 
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b. Efforts/mechanisms to harmonize basic principles in the issue of 
discussion 







The aim of this study is to develop knowledge about the formation of public 
reason in the case of the European Union through the lens of governmentality. The 
research methodology of this study is based on the concept of governmentality as 
introduced by Foucault (1978, 2007), consisting out of three meanings: A complex 
ensemble of structures; A tendency, a type of power; A result of a process.  
The methodological study of governmentality resulted in the identification of a 
broad range of methods and sources for analysis. Primary and secondary information 
has been retrieved through different sources, as outlined in the table below. 
Table 1. Elaboration of research methodology (Own elaboration) 
 
 
Three ideas of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1978, 2007) 
 
 




























A result of a process 
European integration: setting the stage 
• A historically specific form of 
power 
• Characteristics: nature, 
logic, means and ends of 




Goal: unravel the development of the 
mentalities from the founding fathers: 
From the Coal and Steel Industry into a 
Value Enforcing Machinery. 
Sources: Treaties of the 
EU, official EU websites, 
information and fact sheets, 
booklets EU Publication 
Office, (my own) Gnosis 
on the EU (based on my 
teaching practice at St. 
Petersburg State University 
& BA in European Studies) 
 
 
1. Preparation lecture and 
seminar materials for 
teaching practice at the 
course “International 
Language of Globalisation”, 
“Introduction to the 
European Union” 
 
A tendency, a type of power 
(1) Basic democratic values and 
principles 
(2) Fundamental rights 
• The conduct of conduct 
• (Glenn, 2019) Vocabulary 
of state (= genealogy of 




3. Articulation of 
rule 
 
• Forms of subjectivity & 
forms/mechanisms of 
socialisation (Glenn, 2019) 
Sources: Eurobarometers; 
Treaties; EU official 
websites; CFR; Strategy for 
the effective 
implementation of the 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by the European 
Union (COM (2010) 573 
final); Strategy to 
strengthen the application 
of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the 
EU (COM (2020) 711 
final) 
1. Identification of rights, freedoms 
and principles 
2. Strategies on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 
3. Comparison of strategies with 
the use of mind mapping 
 
- Power effects in 
discursive and technical 
aspects 
- Framing and discourse 










Goal: defining specific governmental 
apparatuses 
A complex ensemble of structures  
Application and visualisation 
 
• Forms of subjectivity & 
forms/mechanisms of 







What: institutions, procedures, analysis 
and reflections, calculations, tactics 
(Foucault 1978, 2007) 
Sources: EU official 
websites, infringement 
database EC,  e-Curia 
website, press releases 
 
Data processed in Excel 
1. Output of comparison CFR (list 
of  seven significant differences 
in the interpretation of the same 
values) 
2. Investigation of the rule of law 
framework 
3. Analysis of the infringement 










As laid out by Art. 3(1) the aim of the EU is to promote peace, its values, and the 
well-being of its people. The principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law form the foundation in constructing 
the future of Europe. 
 
In this chapter, the key concepts of public reason and governmentality will be 
researched in the context of the European Union. The foundation of public reason is 
theorized to be based on the basic values as laid down in a constitutional democracy. 
Basic European values have been laid out in the Treaties, declarations and conventions. 
In addition, legal rights of Europeans have been expanded by legal precedents, 
established through European courts (Kostakopoulou, 2008).  
Before the EU can be understood in its contemporary shape, it is necessary to 
look at the mentalities of the founding fathers when the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (1952) was signed, and to explore the path of 








Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers saw federalism as the end state of the 
European Union, which could only be reached gradually. The creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would be the first step along the way of European 
integration, gradually spilling over into other policy areas (McCormick, 2015). The 
idea of cooperating with different states on an international level with the goal to solve 
common issues, would establish new areas and habits of working together. Robert 
Schuman, French foreign minister, was the first to formulate the idea to create a 
common market for coal and steel under the authority of an independent institution. 
The consequent development of the Schuman Declaration by Jean Monnet formed the 
basis for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 
goal was to make it unthinkable and materially impossible for ‘a war like this to happen 
again’, by building an interdependence between Europe’s coal and steel industries 
(Ramiro Troitiño et al., 2020). In 1958, the Treaties of Rome were signed, adding two 
new communities to the ECSC: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), with the aim to create a common 
European market, based on the four freedoms9. The creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was a key stone in the creation of the EU10 that is known today 
(Oxelheim et al., 2020). In this short period of time, European integration resulted in 
the elimination of customs duties, establishment of external Common Customs Tariff 
(CCT), common policies for agriculture and transport, the creation of the European 
Social Fund, and the establishment of the European Investment Bank (EIB)11. The 
process of integration slowed down in the 60s: Charles de Gaulle vetoed the application 
 
9 Four freedoms: free movement of persons, capital, services and goods. 
10 In 1965, the existence of shared institutions between the three communities was formalized through the Merger 
Treaty.  
11 The EIB is one of the world’s largest multilateral borrower and lender, working with EU institutions in the 
implementation of policy. 
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of the United Kingdom twice (1963, 1967), and because of the empty chair crisis12. 
Integration continued in the 70s, with the expansion of membership; Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom were the first new members to join. The way to political 
integration and the economic and monetary Union was paved with the Single European 
Act (1986)13. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) marked a new stage “in the process of 
creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”, and further developed the 
democratic nature of decision-making processes; replaced the initial federal goal with 
an ever-closer Union; further expansion of policy areas, e.g., common foreign and 
security (CFSP), common currency, education and social policy, immigration and 
asylum, police cooperation. Next, it created a single institutional structure ‘European 
Union’, based on three-pillars: (1) European Communities; (2) Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP); (3) Cooperation in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs. The 
second and third pillar made use of intergovernmental methods of decision-making, 
the first pillar is based on supranational characteristics; with the conferral of levels of 
sovereignty from the Member States to the EU level, power has been given to a 
supranational authority of which the legislation would be of direct effect. Furthermore, 
the definition of the principle of subsidiarity has been established by the Maastricht 
Treaty; the principle existed in previous documents, but no procedure was attached on 
how this principle would work in practice. As a result, the Protocol on the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality was established. In 1999, the area 
of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) was created to ensure the free movement of 
persons, while offering a high level of protection to citizens. The creation of the area 
of freedom, security and justice has been based on the Tampere (1999-04), the Hague 
 
12 Empty chair crisis: Member States proposed increased supranational powers to the EC and EP, through a 
change of voting style, from unanimity to what is today known as a qualified majority vote (QMV). As a result, France 
withdrew its representatives from the Council. The empty chair crisis was resolved during the Luxembourg Compromise 
(1966); QMV would not be applicable to issues of “important interest” 
 
13 The Single European Act (1986) set the goal to complete the internal market by 1993, it revised the previous 
treaties, expanded policy areas, reformed the institutions, and paved the way to political integration and the economic and 
monetary Union. Equally important, the qualified majority vote was adopted, and unanimity now only applied to taxation, 
free movement, rights and interests of employed persons 
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(2004-9), and Stockholm (2010-14) programmes (EUR-Lex, n.d.). The policies14 in 
this area fall under shared competences15 between Member States and the EU.  
In Figure 2, a table can be found with main developments from Maastricht until 
the Treaty of Nice (2001).  
 
 
Treaty of Maastricht (1993) 
 
An ever-closer Union Policy expansion Union citizenship 
Single institutional structure European system of Central Banks 
Committee of Regions Economic and Social Committee 
 
Copenhagen Criteria (1993) 
 
 
Ensuring political and economic standards of new members 
 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
 
Pillar one methods apply to several pillar three areas View on enlargement 
 




The Council and European Parliament became co-legislators 
 
 





Increase parliament legislative powers; broadened scope of co-decision 
 
Proposal for a treaty establishing a constitution for Europe 
 
 
Signed but never ratified - 
(Rejected by France and NL in national referenda) 
 
 
In the beginning of the 21st century, efforts were taken to establish a constitution 
for the European Union through the European Convention. In the Open Letter of the 
European Convention (27 March 2002) the success story the Union, the one that was 
facing twin challenges, was highlighted. With an eye on enlargement, there was a need 
to further democratize the Union, and to establish a closer relationship between the 
Institutions of the Union and its citizens. In December 2001, the European Council set 
up a convention to determine the needs of citizens, as well as their perception of the 
 
14 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice covers the policy areas of border checks, asylum, immigration; 
judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; police cooperation. 
15 Refer to Appendix 1, Figure 3 




European Union (The European Convention, 2002). On that note, a website16  for 
readers to follow debates and access documents was established by the Convention. At 
the same time, a two-way communication stream would take place through a second 
website: the Forum17- enabling representatives of civil society and individuals to 
participate in the debate on the future of Europe. The archived Futurum18 website 
served to provide information on developments of the institutional reform of the 
European Union, outlining four main stages 19 : the Treaty of Nice, the European 
Convention, the Intergovernmental Conference, and the European Constitution. The 
European Convention was signed in 2004, but efforts on the ratification of the 
European Constitution turned out unsuccessfully; France and the Netherlands rejected 
it via a national referendum. Consequently, a two-year period of reflection was 
announced; by the end of 2007, a Reform Treaty was to be drawn up by the 
Intergovernmental Conference, which ultimately resulted in the Treaty of Lisbon 
(turned into force two years later) (European Union, n.d.-a). 
The focus of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) was laid on strengthening the 
democratic character of the Union, based on three fundamental principles: democratic 
equality, participatory democracy, representative democracy, as well as strengthening 
the participation of citizens by introducing the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). 
Apart from that, the former third pillar structure ceased to exist, and the 
intergovernmental method was abolished; from that moment on, decision-making 
processes would be governed via the ordinary legislative procedure; the Community 
method turned into the standard procedure of decision-making (Bux, 2020b). Decision-
making processes were not the only elements undergoing change; the place of human 
rights at the core of EU external action was confirmed with the turning into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the legally binding status, on equal footing with the 
 
16 http://european-convention.europa.eu/EN/bienvenue/bienvenue2352.html?lang=EN 
17 The Forum website could not be accessed because it does no longer exist. 
18 https://ec.europa.eu/archives/institutional_reform/ 
19 The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001, turned into force in 2004; the European Convention finished its work 
in 2003; the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003/2004 (October 2003–June 2004); the European Constitution was 
signed in 2004 but never ratified. 
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Treaties, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The changes 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are also reflected in the extension of the co-decision 
procedure to different policy areas. On top of that, the Court was given general 
responsibility in the field of freedom, security and justice.  
According to Art. 67 (1-2), the AFSJ shall be based on respect for fundamental 
rights, the different legal systems, and traditions of the Member States. Next, a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control shall be framed 
based on solidarity between Member States, fair towards third-country nationals. At 
the same time, a high level of security has been described to be offered through the use 
of measures preventing and combat crime, racism and xenophobia. In building the 
future area of justice, freedom and security, the promotion of fundamental rights in the 
Union turned into a priority for the European Parliament and the European Council. 
Please refer to Table 2 in Appendix 2.1 for an overview of the legal foundation on 
which the area of freedom, security and justice is based. 
Building further on the foundations laid for the principle of subsidiarity (1993), 
the Lisbon Treaty offered a further elaboration of its regional and local dimension. In 
Article 5 (3) of the TEU, three preconditions for intervention by EU institutions in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity have been laid down: (1) the area falls 
outside the exclusive competence of the EU; (2) there exists a necessity, i.e., the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be solved more sufficiently at the level of the 
Member States; (3) based on reason or scope, the added value of the action exists; the 
EU can implement it more successfully. The protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is used by EU institutions and national 
parliaments. In accordance with Art. 1 of the protocol, each institution ensures 
consistent respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The principle 
only applies to “shared competence” and applies to all EU institutions. The Treaty of 
Lisbon increased the power of national parliaments and the Court of Justice in 
monitoring compliance (European Parliament, 2020; Protocol 2, TFEU). Finally, a 
differentiation was offered for the first time, between three types of EU competences 
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(App. 1 Figure 4). In Figure 5, an overview can be found of the main changes brought 
about by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Figure 5. Lisbon (Own elaboration). 
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The formation of public reason starts at the level of basic democratic values, as 
laid down in a constitutional democracy. The case of the EU differs slightly; it is an 
international organisation, the EU does not have a constitution, but has adopted the 
practices of democratic decision-making processes.  In the previous part, the process 
of European integration has been discussed to determine the nature and character of 
European governmentality. Next, basic democratic values and principles will be 
determined with the use of the Treaties. 
The functioning of the EU is based on the rule of law, i.e., action can only be 
taken within the legal scope that all Member States have voluntarily and democratically 
agreed upon20. First of all, the Treaties are negotiated and have to be agreed upon by 
all Member States, and are ratified by the national parliaments or by referendum. The 
objectives of the EU, rules for EU institutions, and decision-making processes are laid 
down by the Treaties. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR) has not been incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon, instead, it acquired the same 
legally binding character and value as the Treaties (Murray, 2016). It is important to 
point out that, the CFR could only be interpreted under the legal competences of the 
EU, and ‘shall not extend in any way’ EU competences that have been defined by the 
Treaties (Raulus, 2016; Art. 6 (1) TEU Consolidated Version). Moreover, international 
agreements are separate from primary and secondary legislation, but can be of ‘direct 
effect’; in the case of direct effect, its legal force becomes superior to secondary 
legislation. In Title 1 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) common provisions 
that form the foundation of the European Union have been laid out. By the TEU, a 
European Union has been established among the High Contracting Parties; Member 
States work together and confer competences to the EU level to pursue common 
 
20 The sources of EU law and types of EU legislation can be found in Appendix 1 Figure 6 and 7. 
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objectives. The TEU and TFEU offer the legal basis on which the Union shall be 
founded, having both the same legal value. The aim of the Union is to promote peace, 
the well-being of its peoples and its values (Art. 2 TEU); respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The rationale informing the specified 
values indicates that, those values are “common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail” (Art. 2, TEU). 
Furthermore, key principles of the EU include the principle of conferral; 
principle of sincere cooperation; principle of subsidiarity and degressive 
proportionality. First of all, the scope of EU competence is governed by the principle 
of conferral; there can only be acted if x falls under the competences that have been 
conferred to the EU level. Secondly, the principle of sincere cooperation ensures that 
the Union and the Member States respect and assist each other in the execution of tasks 
derived from the Treaties. In addition, Member States are committed to facilitate the 
achievement of corresponding tasks and will not initiate measures that could jeopardise 
the realization of EU objectives in the areas of Union action (Art. 4 (3) TEU). Thirdly, 
the principle of subsidiarity is concerned with the regulation of the exercise of EU non-
exclusive powers; the EU cannot interfere in areas that could be dealt with more 
efficiently at the level of the Member States, and can only act if Member States are 
unable to achieve the objectives of a proposed action. Finally, the concept of degressive 
proportionality indicates that despite the allocation of seats based on the size of the 
population of a MS, those with a bigger population agree to be under-represented to 
enable a greater representation of those with a smaller population (Pavy, 2020b). 
Moreover, one of the principles accounted for in the Treaties is the principle of 
solidarity. This principle seems to dominate European discourse and communication 
strategies, but lacks in substantial content, “DESIRING to deepen the solidarity 
between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions” 
(Preamble TEU). The term has been listed among the values stipulated in Article 2 
(TEU). The only content accounting for a principle of solidarity would, at first sight, 
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appear to be the solidarity clause in the TFEU; Article 222 (1) “The Union and its 
Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object 
of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made 
available by the Member States” (Consolidated version, 2016). This article is 
concerned with the use of preventative measures in reaction to a terrorist threat in a 
Member State; protecting democratic institutions and the civilian population from any 
terrorist attack. It is important to point out that, the interpretation of Article 222 is not 
intended to infringe the right of a Member State to determine the appropriate means to 
meet its own solidarity obligation (Declaration on Article 222 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union).  
Furthermore, the value of solidarity has been referred to in the Treaties and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, in terms of mutual (political) solidarity. In this context, 
mutual solidarity refers to external action and security policy, as well as the role of 
Member States in providing active support “in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” 
(Art. 24 (2) TEU). In addition, the area of freedom, security and justice is governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility as well. Apart from that, 
Title 4 of the CFR “Solidarity” is concerned with (workers’) right to information, 
collective bargaining and action, access to placement services, prohibition of child 
labour, family and professional life, social security and social assistance, health care, 
access to services of general economic interest, environmental protection, and 
consumer protection. 
Finally, the concept of solidarity has been referred to in energy policy, as well 
as the Declaration of Poland on the protocol on the application of the CFR. In the latter, 




“Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship 
of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship”  
(Art. 9 TEU). 
As discussed in the literature review, normative standards have been created 
before there can be publicly made use of them. The values of the EU can be found in 
Title 1 and 2 of the TEU. Simultaneously, the personal values of citizens as well as 
values best describing the EU have been measured throughout the years; indicating that 
people are familiar with a set of prescribed values and can rank them based on personal 
understanding. Until recently, a selection of twelve values was included in public 
opinion surveys: human rights, respect for human life, peace, democracy, individual 
freedom, the rule of law, equality, solidarity (support for others), tolerance, self-
fulfilment, respect for other cultures, religion. Since 2019, a new value has been 
included in the list; “respect for the planet”.  
Table 3. Values measured in the European Union (Own elaboration21) 
Which three of the following values best 
represent the EU? 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019 
Democracy 38% 37% 31% 31% 35% 34% 
Human rights 38% 35% 36% 34% 34% 32% 
Peace 35% 39% 40% 39% 42% 42% 
The rule of law 25% 23% 18% 20% 23% 22% 
Solidarity, support for others 20% 16% 15% 17% 16% 17% 
Respect for other cultures 18% 17% 14% 12% 13% 15% 
Respect for human life 14% 15% 17% 15% 15% 14% 
Equality 13% 12% 13% 12% 12% 13% 
Individual freedom 12% 12% 17% 15% 16% 15% 
Tolerance 11% 10% 11% 12% 11% 12% 
Self-fulfilment 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 
Religion 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
Respect for the planet      6% 
None 3% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 
Don't know 9% 8% 6% 7% 6% 6% 
 
 
21 (EB74 Autumn 2010: Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 34; EB82 Autumn 2014: Public Opinion in the 
European Union, p. 91; EB78 Autumn 2012: Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 45; E86 Autumn 2016: Public 
Opinion in the European Union, p. 71; EB90 Autumn 2018: European citizenship, p. 61-62; EB91 Spring 2019: European 
citizenship, p. 72). 
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In Table 4, an overview is given on the results of Eurobarometer surveys that 
have been conducted between 2010-2020. Over the period of nine years, the ranking 
of freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU as a personal value indicator 
increased by ten percent, to a total of 55%. 
Table 4. What the EU means for respondents personally (Own elaboration22) 
What does the EU mean for you personally? 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019 
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU 45% 42% 50% 49% 53% 55% 
Euro 40% 35% 39% 35% 37% 37% 
Peace 24% 26% 29% 28% 33% 35% 
Cultural diversity 23% 19% 28% 26% 30% 31% 
Bureaucracy 21% 23% 26% 25% 24% 23% 
Waste of money 25% 27% 25% 24% 22% 21% 
Not enough control at the external borders 17% 15% 20% 24% 20% 20% 
Stronger say in the world 23% 18% 25% 22% 27% 29% 
Democracy 23% 19% 22% 21% 26% 27% 
More crime 14% 13% 15% 15% 15% 13% 
Economic prosperity 13% 12% 15% 13% 18% 20% 
Unemployment 14% 18% 17% 13% 10% 11% 
Loss of our cultural identity 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 
Social protection 10% 9% 9% 10% 13% 14% 
Other 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
Don't know 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 
 
 Figure 8. Satisfaction with democracy: Parlemeter 2019, p. 17. 
 
 
22 (EB74 Autumn 2010: Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 33; EB82 Autumn 2014: European Citizenship, p. 60; 
EB86 Autumn 2016: European Citizenship, pp. 64-65; EB77 Spring 2012: Values of Europeans, p. 12; EB90 Autumn 




In the previous part, information has been provided about the common values 
and main principles on which the EU is based. This was necessary to understand which 
values might be appealed to in discourse in the public political forum. It goes without 
saying that the outlined information is only a fragment of the available resources for 
the interpretation of common values and principles. However, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, the previously outlined values and principles will serve as the foundation, 
which will be complemented by a comparison of strategies on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.   
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Despite the failed ratification of the constitution for Europe, the Charter  
acquired a legally binding status on equal footing with the Treaties. In order to ensure 
the effective application of the Charter, the members of the Commission solemnly 
pledged to uphold the Charter before the Court, a member of the Commission was 
appointed for the promotion of justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, and a 
strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter by the EU (2010) was 
developed. Apart from that, with the changes brought about to the area of freedom, 
security and justice with the Lisbon Treaty, the promotion of fundamental rights in this 
area turned into a key priority for the European Parliament and the Council.  
 In light of the 10th Anniversary of the Charter (2020), efforts were successfully 
taken to develop a new strategy on the application of the CFR; the Council of the 
European Union adopted conclusions, and reaffirmed that common values form the 
foundation on which the Union is based. The rule of law has been described as a key 
guarantor for the protection of common values. According to the Council of the 
European Union (2019), common values underpin “our” democratic and social models, 
and are the “foundation of European freedom, security and prosperity” (p. 2). The need 
to strengthen awareness-raising and training activities was underlined, noting that 
public awareness on the Charter remains low. As a result, the Commission announced 
a public consultation23 on the development of a New Strategy for the Implementation 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Eight months after the consultation, the 
Commission published a Communication Act on the Strategy to strengthen the 
application of the CFR in the EU. In the following part, COM (2010) 573 final and 
COM (2020) 711 final will be compared to visualise the redefinition of the application 
of the Charter. 
 
23 The public consultations took place in the period of 19 March 2020 – 16 April 2020. 
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Towards making the Charter a living reality for all 
In 2010, the Charter turned into an innovative instrument that ensures the 
protection of FR by making the rights visible and predictable for the benefit of citizens. 
This strategy was brought into being to adapt to the new legal environment that was 
created in 2007, therefore, the focus was laid on establishing a fundamental rights 
culture by incorporating FR in the legislative and decision-making processes of all 
Union institutions. Four points of action were formulated to ensure the effective 
application of the Charter by the EU: (1) enable those living in the EU to enjoy their 
rights; (2) mutual trust between EU countries; (3) public confidence in EU policy; (4) 
credibility of EU external action on human rights (Publication Office, 2016). The 
adoption of the CFR symbolized a new stage of European integration, where the 
Charter transformed into “one of the most modern and comprehensive legally binding 
fundamental rights instruments” (Council of the European Union, 2019, p. 3). In Figure 
9, a deconstruction of the logic of reasoning of the first strategy (2010) can be found. 
 
2020. Building further on the first strategy on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the second strategy focuses on making the Charter a reality for all; presenting 
a renewed commitment to ensure the effective application of fundamental rights in the 
European Union. Throughout the years, new EU legislation for the direct protection 
Figure 9. Logic of reasoning (2010) (Own elaboration) 
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and promotion of certain rights 24  was developed. Apart from that, the scope of 
interpretation of fundamental rights has been expanded through legal precedents of 
cases brought before the Court. The Charter transformed from an innovative instrument 
into the embodiment of EU rights and values, symbolising European identity “our EU 
bill of rights”, and has been described as a quantum leap for European integration, 
reaffirming the foundation on which the EU is based; (1) fundamental rights; (2) 
democracy; (3) the rule of law. 
Figure 10. Components of strategy vision (Own elaboration) 
 
Methodology 
In 2010, the focus was laid on the establishment of an internal structure to ensure 
the compliance with FR in the work of the institutions and bodies of the Union. The 
EP as an intermediary in “finding out about” the situation in MS with regards to 
fundamental rights, involved through questions and petitions. The Fundamental Rights 
Agency has been described as a tool to help institutions and MS implementing Union 
law. The Agency was to be encouraged to provide reliable and comparable data on 
fundamental rights- crucial input for the annual report. In accordance with this strategy, 
the role of national authorities (Supreme Courts, independent national human rights 
bodies, national authorities responsible for the assessment of the impact of national 
legislation on fundamental rights) could be interpreted as a passive one- the 
Commission “will also take on board information provided by all stakeholders” 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 13). Other sources of information could be derived 
from the monitoring machinery of the Council of Europe (international human rights 
organisation) and the United Nations, and information from civil society. The annual 
 
24 Such as data protection, gender equality, whistle blowers, fair trial and defence rights, victims of crime. 
Making the Charter a reality for all
Ensuring effective application MS
Empowering CSO, rights defenders, justice 
practitioners
Fostering use of CFR as compass EU 
Strengthening people awareness rights
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report would enable all stakeholders to “make a contribution”. Apart from that, the 
Communication Act offered a “Fundamental Rights “Check-list”: 
Figure 11. Fundamental Rights Check-list (European Commission, 2010) 
 
In the footnote of the page containing the Fundamental Rights “Check-list”, there has 
been referred to Communication of the EC called “Compliance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in Commission Legislative proposals” (2005-ongoing). In this 
Communication, a methodology for ‘systematic and rigorous monitoring’ has been 
outlined. In the Stockholm programme, there has been described that, the clear and 
comprehensible drafting of EU legislation will help citizens to effectively exercise their 
rights. Therefore, it is expected that the Charter is taken into account, in the ex-post 
evaluation of Union instruments, especially in “reports on the application of sensitive 
legislation and in the mutual evaluation process”. In 2009, a special guideline25 on 
Impact Assessment was put in place (currently no longer in use).  
The objective of the latest strategy (2020) is to ensure the effective application 
by Member States, by partnering with Member States (national, local); it is an 





values, including, e.g., the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)790), the first 
Rule of Law report (COM(2020)580). Steps have been taken by the Commission to 
help Member States ensure that EU funded programmes are implemented in 
compliance with the Charter. The proposal for the Common Provision Regulation 
(CPR) in which rules for the EU budget 2021-2027 have been laid down, offers a so-
called enabling condition; all programmes that receive funding from the EU (under 
CPR funds) would be governed by a mechanism put in place to ensure their compliance 
with the Charter, from the first stage on. It should be noted that, the legislative proposal 
(2018/0196(COD), on which the sub-paragraph ‘ensuring the application of the Charter 
in EU funding’ lines of action have been based, is still awaiting the Council’s first 
reading position. In other words, the formulation of a part of the strategy has been based 
on a legislative proposal that had not been approved since 2018 (dated moment of 
publication of the new strategy).  
External action and credibility 
Fundamental rights are the basic principles on which EU external action has 
been based; advancing democracy, “the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles 
of equality and solidarity and the respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law” (Art. 21 TEU in European Commission, 2010, p. 4). 
Article 8 (TEU) stipulates that, relations with neighbouring countries are based on the 
values of the Union. The internal dimension has been concerned with putting 
appropriate checks and balances in place, with the aim to strengthen the externally 
perceived credibility of the EU in promoting human rights worldwide (Strategy 2010). 
Respect for fundamental rights would contribute to building mutual trust between MS, 
thereby, public confidence in Union’s policy. Apart from that, the implementation of 
the CFR has been considered essential to ensure the effective operation and the 
strengthening of the cooperation machinery in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Furthermore, external relations of the Union have been based on the promotion of 
human rights and democratisation in non-member countries, as well as building 
relationships with neighbouring countries based on the values of the Union (Art. 8 
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TEU). The objective of this strategy (2010) “Union must be exemplary”, was to be 
achieved by the adoption and incorporation of a FR methodology in the decision-
making processes, to strengthen the Union’s credibility in the promotion of human 
rights around the world. Next, ambitious FR policy has been considered an essential 
component in the construction of the Union. In the first strategy, the focus was laid on 
establishing the foundation required for enabling the enforcement of the Charter; 
transforming it into a compass guiding the institutions. In this process, less attention 
was paid to the engagement of stakeholders. Finally, the CFR offered more visible and 
legally secured rights for the citizens. In Figure 12, a  breakdown of the focus of EU 
external action in 2010 has been outlined. 
Figure 12. Focus of EU external action 2010 (Own elaboration). 
 
Finally, in the first strategy (2010), three principles for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights have been specified: (1) prevention; (2) infringement procedures; 
(3) situations outside the scope of the Charter. The last principle highlights the 
importance that the function of the Charter is not to replace the existing systems of 
Member States that ensure the compliance with fundamental rights; the Charter only 
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applies to breaches taking place in situations governed by EU law. However, when 
there is a “clear risk of a serious breach or a serious and persistent breach” of  EU 
values by a Member State, a political mechanism of last resort can be triggered: Article 
7 (European Commission, 2010). In Appendix 3.1. an overview can be found with the 
comparison of specific elements of both strategies. 
The first strategy focused on effective implementation by the EU, the second 
strategy revolves around strengthening the application in the EU. There has been stated 
that, the protection of fundamental rights should not be taken for granted; challenges 
have arisen in the areas of migration and security, restrictions have been imposed on 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of the pandemic, and the inequality gap 
has widened. The EU is considered a global actor when it comes to the promotion of 
human rights; worldwide pressure on democracy, the rule of law and human rights are 
reasons why EU action would be required in this area. However, in order to construct 
the EU as a global actor for human rights, fundamental rights issues should be 
addressed inside the EU [Member States], and should be taken as a basis for all action 
taken in non-EU, bilateral, regional and multi-lateral cooperation. In Figure 13, a 
visualisation of the logic based on the information presented in the strategy can be 
found. 








Moreover, there has been argued that fundamental rights could only be effective 
with independent courts guaranteeing protection, an open and informed democratic 
debate, independent media, and an active civil society (In Strategy 2020). Civil society 
organisations, rights defenders and justice practitioners have been described to be 
empowered through the creation of a supportive and enabling environment, part of the 
new Union values strand of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme. In  
the latest strategy, the role of stakeholders changed from a passive one to an active one; 
EU institutions, bodies and agencies; national and local authorities; law enforcement, 
legislators and judges, legal practitioners, CSO in FR, rights defenders, all have a key 
role to play in realising the effective application of the Charter. Upholding EU FR and 
values has been described as a shared responsibility, requiring a collective effort from 
all stakeholders. In addition, CSOs and rights defenders have been described as key 
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parties in the Charter’s enforcement chain; all parties in the “enforcement chain” have 
the duty to ensure that the Charter turns into a living instrument, “protecting 
fundamental rights in Europe for the benefit of all” (European Commission, 2020, p. 
19). According to the European Commission (2020), the increasing number of 
independent National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and bodies in Europe lays 
down “solid foundations for the enforcement of individual’s rights in practice” (p. 2). 
The effective application of Charter is considered a precondition to fulfil the Union’s 
commitment to “leave no one behind”. Different mechanisms for the protection and 
enforcement of fundamental rights have been introduced under the strategy, focused 
on (1) prevention; (2) promotion and application; (3) coordination; (4) enforcement. 
         
           
     
Upholding EU FR and values = shared 
responsibility   
Key parties for 
Charter's effective 
application 
    Collective effort    
   EU institutions, bodies, agencies   
 
   National and local authorities   
   Law enforcement Legislators and judges   
     Legal practitioners CSO in FR   
     Rights defenders   
           




Strands of work mutually reinforce each other
Effective protection FR in the EU
National and international FR protection systems
Constitutional traditions
International obligations [common to MS]
Figure 14. Parties in Charter application (Own elaboration) 
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The comparison of the two strategies on the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
demonstrated a shift of the Union’s logic in the justification of actions outlined in the 
strategies. The underlying idea of public reason, that justice denies that the loss of 
freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The interpretation 
of the meaning of freedom in this sense is a difficult one, especially when it concerns 
freedoms to be guaranteed by a power structure beyond the nation state. In the previous 
parts, key moments in the path of European integration have been determined, pointing 
at the democratization of the EU, the increasing focus on the “European citizen”, and 
the need to legitimize the actions taken by the Union at the international level, based 
on human dignity, freedom, equality, the rule of law and human rights. To this end, the 
focus on the creation of externally perceived legitimacy has been visibly present in 
both strategies. The results show that, among others, Article 7 referred to as a FR 
enforcing mechanism in the first strategy, has been replaced by newly proposed 
mechanisms in the second strategy: application of the Charter in EU funding, 
coordination through Charter focal points, focus on CSOs and rights defenders 
(capacity building). On that note, discussions have been taking place on the integrity 
of EU external action in the eyes of the public. Furthermore, per the logic of the 
aforementioned tools, stakeholder groups from civil society, law enforcement, as well 
as legislators, judges, legal practitioners and rights defenders, would be directly 
involved in the application of the Charter. As previously discussed, the Charter may 
not be interpreted in a way that it would extent the competences of the EU beyond what 
has been laid down in the Treaties. These conclusions result in the need to determine 
the input and output legitimacy of the new strategy on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. This comparison shed light on the reinterpretation and recontextualization of 
role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
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1. Adapting to new legal context vs. protection of FR should not be taken for 
granted 
2. Institutionalisation of a fundamental rights culture vs. our EU bill of rights 
3. CFR as an instrument vs. CFR as the embodiment of Union citizenship;  
4. Methodological compliance vs. integration of compliance mechanisms in 
different EU policy tools;  
5. FR as a basis for External Action and the AFSJ for credibility and trust vs. 
addressing FR internally relates to EU external relations (bilateral, regional 
and multilateral) 
6. Enforcing fundamental rights through prevention, infringement procedures, 
situations outside the Charter and Article 7 vs. prevention, promotion and 
implementation, coordination, enforcement (infringement procedures and 
annual report) 
7. Infringement procedures vs. promotion and implementation, coordination 
 
In the next part, there will be zoomed in on the primary mechanisms that exists 
in the legal framework of the EU to ensure the compliance of Member States with EU 
law: the rule of law framework, infringement procedures.  
“In recent years, the European Commission has been confronted with crisis events in some 
EU countries, which revealed systemic threats to the rule of law. The Commission reacted by 
adopting the rule of law framework to address such threats in EU countries” (European 
Commission, n.d.). 
The rule of law framework has been created with the objective to prevent a 
situation to escalate into the triggering of the Article 7 procedure, through dialogue 
with the Member State concerned. The rule of law is an enduring value of the EU, and 
its principles develop through legal precedents of cases brought before the Court. In 
fact, there are three legal procedures that could be started against a Member State in 
case of non-compliance with EU law: infringement procedures, preliminary cases, 
Article 7 TEU. Before the decision would be made to pursue legal steps against a 
Member State, it would be preferable to make use of the soft mechanisms available 
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under the rule of law framework. Even though the soft mechanisms do not directly 
result into legally binding implications, these mechanisms are perceived as having 
“political resonance” and could pave the way towards legal action (European Union, 
2019). The case of Poland sheds light on the ineffectiveness of existing tools and 
mechanisms of enforcement: the threat to fundamental values and the activation of 
Article 7 (TEU) led to the application of the ‘new EU Framework to strengthen the 
Rule of Law’ for the first time.  
Figure 15. The rule of law framework (Own elaboration26) 
The rule of law framework 
Objective 
Mechanism with the aim to prevent the escalation 
leading to the activation of Article 7  
 
How Dialogue with EU country concerned  
Process 
1. Commission assessment  
2. Commission recommendation  
3. Monitoring EU country follow-up recommendation  
Last resort Article 7  
 
As previously outlined, an infringement procedure is one of the legal pathways 
to ensure compliance with EU law, and as legal precedents serve as the foundation for 
the (further) creation of principles of the rule of law in the EU, an analysis of 
infringement procedures in (1) Justice, fundamental rights and citizenship; (2) Home 
affairs, will be conducted. An infringement procedure is one of the four types of 
common cases27 that could be brought before the Court28. An infringement procedure 
 
26 Based on: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-
law-framework_en 
27 1. Preliminary: check the proper application of EU law in MS. National courts may ask the court for advice 
when in doubt about the interpretation or validity of EU law. The advice given by the court is called a binding preliminary 
ruling; 2. Infringement proceedings: can be brought before the court by the EC and in some cases by a MS. This concerns 
the fact that a MS is failing to fulfil its obligations under EU law. The court investigates the allegations and gives its 
judgment; 3. Proceedings for annulment: can be brought before the court by MS, the Council, the EC, the EP- if they 
think that certain EU law is illegal, can ask for annulment. Individuals may also use this proceeding; 4. Proceedings for 
failure to act: under the treaty, the EP, Council and EC are required to make certain decisions under certain circumstances. 
If there is believed that they have failed to do so, a MS, other EU institutions, individuals or companies can lodge a 
complaint. 
28 The Court of Justice, located in Luxembourg, ensures the equal interpretation and application of EU law in all 
Member States. It checks the legality of EU institutions, ensures that all MS comply with their obligations and interprets 
EU law at the request of national courts. Member States, EU institutions, businesses and individuals all have the right to 
appeal to the Court. 
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could be launched by the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, or in special cases 
by a Member State. The first step of an infringement procedure is concerned with the 
issuance of an official letter of formal notice to the government in question. In a letter 
of formal notice, there would be elaborated on the situation in which the Member State 
in question is considered to be infringing EU law. Within a given period, a detailed 
reply is to be sent by the Member State, and if the Member State fails to correct the 
matter during this procedure, a reasoned opinion may be issued by the Commission. 
Finally, if the first stages of the infringement procedure turn out unsuccessfully, the 
case could be referred  to the Court of Justice.  
The database of the European Commission on infringement procedures has been 
consulted to determine the number of infringement procedures in the policy areas of 
(1) Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship; (2) Home Affairs. The search entries 
on the two policy areas have been narrowed down  with the following parameters:  
Figure 16. Search parameters infringement database (Own elaboration29) 
 
In the process of data gathering, the decision has been made to filter the search 
results based on the presence of press releases or memos attached to the case. This was 
considered necessary to enable the verification of the cases. During the process of data 
analysis, it appeared that the links to press releases and memos to separate cases were 
invalid. However, after altering the links; replacing the dash signs by underscores, all 
links appeared to work. Consequently, the process of information checking began, 
which led to the identification of another error in the information provided in the 
 
29 Based on the infringement database from the European Commission  
List of infringement Status Type of infringement Infringement number Decision date 
By case Active cases 
Non-communication 
cases Blank From 
By decision 
Closed infringement 
cases Other  To 
 All All   
Decision type Press release/Memo  Country Policy area Title 
Blank Yes Blank 
Justice, Fundamental 
Rights and Citizenship Blank 
 No  Home Affairs  
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database; most of the cases that were indicated to be open cases, were closed. At the 
same time, the status in the database would most likely refer not to the status of the 
lawsuit, but of the infringement procedure itself. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
the active status of a case referring to either the procedure in its entirety or the judgment 
of the case has not been offered on the database. These results complicated the process 
of data analysis, nevertheless, as reasoning takes place behind the veil of ignorance, 
the most significant information that has been gathered through the European 
Commission infringement database will be outlined. 
3.3.1 Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
The search on Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship resulted in a list of 
22 [twelve active] cases against fifteen countries (2006-now). Next, the number of 
cases was narrowed down to eleven cases by excluding those that started before 2006, 
and those concerned with the incorrect transposition of Directives. This resulted in the 
exclusion of three cases from 2006 (the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden), and the 
exclusion of eight cases concerning the (incorrect) transposition of a Directive 
(Germany 2010; Germany 2011; Austria 2011; UK 2011; Sweden 2011; Czech 
Republic 2011; Lithuania 2011; Bulgaria 2012). In Table 5, an overview can be found 
with the specifics of the selected cases.   
 







Court Closing case Status database 
INFR(2011)4147 Italy 24-11-2011 17-10-2013 16-10-2014 24-1-2019 Closed 
VIOLATION DE LA DIRECTIVE 2004/80/CE RELATIVE À 
L'INDEMNISATION DES VICTIMES DE LA CRIMINALITÉ. C-601/14 25-11-2016   
INFR(2012)2011 Hungary 17-1-2012 7-3-2012 25-4-2012 16-10-2014 Closed 
VIOLATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF DATA PROTECTION 
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY C-288/12     
INFR(2012)2012 Hungary 17-1-2012 7-3-2012 25-4-2012 20-11-2013 Closed 
RETIREMENT AGE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND 
PUBLIC NOTARIES C-286/12     
INFR(2013)2084 Finland 20-6-2013 20-11-2013 10-7-2014 
Removal 
from register Closed 
 
30 Making use of Export to Excel option through the European Commission database, having reformatted the 
table, as well as repairing the broken links to the press releases, and adding information from the e-Curia database. 
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Non-conformity of Finnish legislation with Directive 2000/43/EC as 
regards the competences of the national equality body 11-9-2015   
INFR(2017)2110 Hungary 13-7-2017 4-10-2017 7-12-2017 18-6-2020 Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY THE ACT ON THE 
TRANSPARENCY OF ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTED FROM 
ABROAD (ACT LXXVI/2017) ADOPTED ON 13 JUNE 2017  C-78/18     
INFR(2017)2119 Poland 28-7-2017 12-9-2017 20-12-2017 6-12-2019 Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY THE LAW AMENDING THE LAW 
ON ORDINARY COURTS ORGANISATION. C-192/18     
INFR(2017)2121 Poland 2-7-2018 14-8-2018 20-12-2017 Closed Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY THE NEW LAW ON THE 
SUPREME COURT C-619/18     
INFR(2019)2076 Poland 3-4-2019 17-7-2019 10-10-2019 Active Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY THE NEW DISCIPLINARY 
REGIME FOR JUDGES IN POLAND C-791/19     
INFR(2020)2182 Poland 29-4-2020 30-10-2020   Active Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING THE 
JUDICIARY     
INFR(2020)2300 Cyprus 20-10-2020       Active 
CYPRUS INVESTOR CITIZENSHIP SCHEME         
INFR(2020)2301 Malta 20-10-2020       Active 
MALTA INVESTOR CITIZENSHIP SCHEME         
 
Next, the cases have been grouped based on the categories established in the 
press releases or per country. First of all, the latest cases concerning [Country] Investor 
Citizenship Scheme will be discussed. Secondly, the cases against Poland from 2020-
2017 with regards to the judiciary will be outlined. Next, there will  be looked at the 
cases against Hungary 2017-2012, with a main focus on the Hungarian law on foreign-
funded NGOs. Finally, there will be looked at the remaining cases, Finland and Italy. 
Selling EU citizenship (INFR(2020)2300/2301). In October 2020, the initiation 
of the infringement procedures against Cyprus and Malta was announced by the 
European Commission in one press release. Both cases are concerned with [country] 
Investor Citizenship Scheme. The topic of the infringement procedure has been 
described in the headline of the press release as “selling” EU citizenship (European 
Commission, 2020a). The investor citizenship scheme has been referred to as “golden 
passport” schemes. The Commission argues that, the granting of nationality in 
exchange for a predetermined payment of investment, is in conflict with Article 4 (3) 
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TEU, and undermines “the integrity of the status of EU citizenship”31. In this aspect, 
the granting of nationality has been directly connected with EU citizenship; this scheme 
undermines the essence of EU citizenship. In this press release, there has been stated 
that, the Commission would write to Bulgaria as well, highlighting the same issue. At 
the same time, the only case of Bulgaria that appeared in the filtered search results is a 
case from 2012, concerned with the participation of EU citizens in European elections.  
Figure 17. Snapshot press release (European Commission, 2020a). 
 
Protecting judges in Poland from political control. The four infringement 
procedures Commission v Poland (C-619/18; C-192/18; C-791/19; INFR(2020)2182)), 
are concerned with the rule of law in Poland. The press releases of the formal letters 
and reasoned opinions have been processed in WordStat8 to determine the topics of 
the infringement procedures in the area of Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 
resulting in the word cloud below: 
Figure 18. Word cloud based on frequency: Poland (Wordstat8). 
 
 
31 Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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The rule of law is one of the common values32 on which the EU is based. In 
2016, a dialogue has been opened with Poland under the Rule of Law Framework; “The 
Commission stands ready to continue the ongoing rule of law dialogue with Poland, 
which remains the Commission's preferred channel for resolving the systemic threat to 
the rule of law in Poland” (European Commission, 2018a). When referring to the e-
Curia database, it appeared that cases C-619/18 and C-192/18 have been closed, in 
contrast to the status of the procedures in the European Commission infringement 
database.  
The Hungarian law on foreign-funded NGOs. Case INFR(2017)2110, 
Commission v Hungary (C-78/18) has been concerned with Transparency of 
associations (receiving of foreign donations). While in the database of the European 
Commission, the case has been marked as an active case, the e-Curia website indicates 
that the case has been closed; the judgment of the Court was issued on 18 June 2020, 
concluding that the law on the Transparency of Organisations poses unjustifiable 
restrictions on foreign donations to CSOs, thereby, breaching its obligations under 
Article 63 TEU, Articles 7-8 and 12 of the CFR. However, in February 2021, a new 
letter of formal notice was sent concerning the failure of compliance with the ruling of 
the Court of Justice. 
Independence authorities and measures affecting the judiciary. In January 
2012, two infringement procedures were started against Hungary, with regards to the 
independence of authorities and measures affecting the judiciary, that came in force 
with Hungary’s new constitution. After carrying out a legal assessment of the new 
legislation, the Commission concluded that, the Hungarian law was in conflict with EU 
law. The cases were combined in the press releases of the formal notice, reasoned 
opinion, and the referral to the Court. In April 2012, the Commission expressed its 
satisfaction with the changes brought to the Central Bank statute, but referred Hungary 
to the Court concerning two other cases: the independence of data protection authority 
(C-288/12), and the retirement ages of judges (C-286/12). 
 
32 Article 2 TEU 
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Finland (C-538/14). In July 2014, Finland was referred to the Court based on 
“not having a racial equality body for employment matters” (European Commission, 
2014). The equality body of Finland does not carry out specific tasks in the area of 
racial equality and employment. The proposed Non-Discrimination Act (April 2014) 
by the Finnish government was considered to be insufficient to solve the issue. Adding 
this up to the fact that the extensive discussions with Finland did not result in concrete 
progress, the decision was made to refer the case to the Court. 
Italy: Insufficient rules on compensation for crime victims. In November 
2011, the infringement procedure against Italy was launched with the issuance of a 
formal notice. Over the course of three years, Italy failed to undertake the necessary 
steps in amending its legislation. Therefore, the case was referred to the Court in 
October 2014. The judgment on the case was delivered in 2016, the Italian Republic 
was ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those from the Commission, and the 
Council was ordered to bear its own costs. On the infringement database of the 
Commission, the procedure was indicated to have been closed in January 2019. 
3.3.2 Home Affairs 
The search on the policy area of Home Affairs resulted in a list of 13 
infringement cases against nine countries (2010-now); seven active cases, five closed 
cases. After referring to the e-Curia webpage from the Court, it appeared that only two 
cases are open at this moment INFR(2019)2193; INFR(2018)2247 (Hungary). Be it as 
it may, it could be the case that the status of the cases refers to the infringement 
procedure in its entirety, but those would be assumptions based on non-presence of 
information on the database. In Table 6, an overview is offered of the case results, 
including (working) links to the press releases enclosed to each case that appeared with 
the aforementioned search parameters. 












INFR(2010)2093 Belgium 30-9-2010 29-9-2011 21-11-2012 14-3-2014 Closed 
 
33 Making use of Export to Excel option through the European Commission database, having reformatted the 
table, as well as repairing the broken links to the press releases, and adding information from the e-Curia database. 
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NON-CONFORMITE AVEC LE REGLEMENT (CE) 2252/2004 SUR 
LES ELEMENTS BIOMETRIQUES DANS LES PASSEPORTS C-139/13     





Implementation of the right to 
appeal against a visa 
refusal/annulment/revocation 17-10-2013 26-2-2015 C-614/18   




Lack of implementation of certain obligations under EU 
document security legislation C-130/17   
INFR(2015)2197 Croatia 10-12-2015 14-6-2017     Active 
INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION BY CROATIA OF THE RECAST EURODAC 
REGULATION (EU) 603/2013    
INFR(2015)2201 Hungary 10-12-2015 7-12-2017 19-7-2018 Closed Active 
INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION BY HUNGARY OF EU 
ASYLUM AND MIGRATION ACQUIS C-808/18     
INFR(2015)2202 Greece 10-12-2015     8-12-2016 Closed 
INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECAST EURODAC 
REGULATION (EU) 603/2013     
INFR(2015)2203 Italy 10-12-2015     8-12-2016 Closed 
INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECAST EURODAC 
REGULATION (EU) 603/2013    
INFR(2017)2092 
Czech 
Republic 14-6-2017 26-7-2017 7-12-2017 Closed Active 
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTLY BY CZECHIA 
COUNCIL DECISIONS (EU) 2015/1523 AND 2015/1601 ON 
RELOCATION C-719/17    
INFR(2017)2093 Hungary 14-6-2017 26-7-2017 7-12-2017 Closed Active 
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTLY BY HUNGARY 
COUNCIL DECISION 2015/1601 ON RELOCATION C-718/17     
INFR(2017)2094 Poland 14-6-2017 26-7-2017 7-12-2017 Closed Active 
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTLY BY POLAND 
COUNCIL DECISIONS (EU) 2015/1523 AND 2015/1601 ON 
RELOCATION C-715/17     
INFR(2018)2247 Hungary 19-7-2018 24-1-2019 25-7-2019   Active 
VIOLATION OF EU LAW BY MEANS OF THE ACT VI OF 2018 
AMENDING CERTAIN ACTS WITH RESPECT TO MEASURES 
AGAINST ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE SEVENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY  C-821/19     
INFR(2018)4087 Hungary 19-7-2018 24-1-2019 25-7-2019   Closed 
Incorrect implementation of the Long-term Residents Directive 
(2003/109/EC) C-761/19     
INFR(2019)2193 Hungary 25-7-2019 10-10-2019     Active 
DE FACTO DETENTION OF RETURNEES IN THE TRANSIT 
ZONES       
 
The cases have been grouped based on categories established by the press 
releases, the Court or per country. First of all, there will be looked at three procedures 
against Hungary: De facto detention of returnees in the transit zones 
(INFR(2019)2193), the incorrect implementation of the long-term residents Directive 
(C-761/19), and the case concerning EU asylum and return legislation (C-821/19). 
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Secondly, the combined case against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be 
discussed. Furthermore, the procedures against Italy, Greece and Croatia with regards 
to the Eurodac regulation, as well as C-808/18 against Hungary, will be outlined. 
Finally, there will be looked at the remaining individual procedures against Bulgaria 
(C-130/17), Slovakia (C-614/18), and Belgium (C-139/13).  
Hungarian transit zones (C-821/19 and INFR(2193).  On 25 July 2018, the 
Commission announced the referral of Hungary to the Court regarding the 
criminalization of activities in support of applicants for a residence permit or asylum 
(C-821/19, 2018), the exclusion of non-EU nationals possessing a long-term residency 
permit (C-761/19) from exercising the veterinary profession (European Commission, 
2019). As shown in Table 7, the formal notices of cases 2247 and 4087 were published 
on the same day, but in different press releases. The latter was included in a general 
memo of that month “July infringement package: key decisions”, and the former had 
an individual press release that simultaneously served as the announcement of the 
referral to the Court of the first infringement procedure (2201) ever started against 
Hungary in this area regarding the incorrect implementation of the EU asylum and 
migration acquis.  
Table 7. Home Affairs: Hungary (Own elaboration) 
INFR(2018)2247 Hungary 19-7-2018 24-1-2019 25-7-2019 
Measures against illegal immigration C-821/19 
INFR(2018)4087 Hungary 19-7-2018 24-1-2019 25-7-2019 
Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) (Veterinary profession) C-761/19 
INFR(2019)2193 Hungary 25-7-2019 10-10-2019   
DE FACTO DETENTION OF RETURNEES IN THE TRANSIT ZONES   
 
Table 8. EU Asylum and migration acquis – Hungary (Own elaboration) 
INFR(2015)2201 Hungary 10-12-2015 7-12-2017 19-7-2018 
INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION BY HUNGARY OF EU ASYLUM AND 
MIGRATION ACQUIS C-808/18 
 
On 19 July 2018, the formal notice of cases INFR(2018)4087 and 
INFR(2018)2247, the issue concerning the criminalisation of activities in support of 
asylum and residence applications, as well as the Hungarian law on foreign-funded 
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NGOs, were announced. In this press release34, there has been referred back the first 
infringement procedure with regards to Hungarian asylum laws (C-808/18). Next to 
that, the Commission sent a letter for formal notice, initiating a new infringement 
procedure against Hungary, with regards to the non-provision of food in transit zones 
with Serbia (INFR(2019)2193). The new case is concerned with those35  who are 
compelled to stay in the Hungarian transit zones at the border with Serbia. The 
compulsory nature of the stay of people in Hungarian transit zones has been qualified 
as detention under the Return Directive36. Consequently, there has been argued that, 
the detention conditions in the Hungarian transit zones are not in line with the material 
conditions applicable, as laid down by the Return Directive and the CFR. 
In 2015, an infringement procedure against Hungary was launched. After 
receiving the reply provided by the Hungarian authorities, the decision was made to 
refer the case to the Court. This decision was based on the grounds that a large number 
of the issues that had been previously addressed, had not been resolved by the 
Hungarian authorities. Furthermore, Hungarian legislation was said to be found 
incompatible with EU law in three areas: Asylum procedures (transit zones at external 
borders); Reception conditions (breach Reception Conditions Directive); Return 
(inconsistency with EU law). The letter of formal notice was concerned with Hungarian 
law, referred to as “Stop Soros” by the Hungarian authorities, that criminalises all 
forms assistance provided in support of asylum or residence applications. Hungary has 
been offered support and assistance by the Commission. The Venice Commission and 
the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights published a joint 






35 Persons whose applications for international protection have been rejected, waiting to be returned to a third 
country. 
36 DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
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Figure 19. Word cloud based on frequency: Hungary (Wordstat8). 
   
Commission v Republic of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic. The cases  C-
715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17 were joined by the Court for the purpose of judgment. 
The three defendants have been brought before the Court due to failure of meeting 
obligations under Decisions (EU) 2015/1523 and (EU) 2015/160137, as well as the 
provisional measures concerning international protection in support of Italy and 
Greece. The three Member States have failed to comply with the obligation to indicate 
at least every three months an appropriate number of applicants that could be relocated 
to their territories (CJEU, 2020).  
Migration and asylum. In December 2015, the Commission launched eight 
infringement procedures to ensure the implementation of the Common European 
Asylum System, concerning Greece, Croatia, Italy, Malta and Hungary. In the press 
release of the formal notification (cases INFR(2015)2203 INFR(2015)2202), Greece, 
Croatia and Italy were urged to implement the Eurodac regulation (Regulation (EU) 
No 603/2013), relating to fingerprinting of asylum seekers and data transmission to the 
Eurodac central system. The implementation of the Eurodac regulation is necessary for 
 
37 Article 5(2) and 5(4) to 5(11) 
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the functioning of the relocation schemes and the Dublin regulation (European 
Commission, 2015).  
In 2018, Slovakia (C-614/18) was taken to Court due to failure of providing 
judicial remedies against refusals, annulments or revocations of visas. The 
infringement procedure against Bulgaria (C-130/17) was initiated in 2013, and referred 
to the Court about three years later. The case has been concerned with the failure to 
implement rules on e-passports and e-residence permits. Furthermore, Belgium (C-
139/13) was brought before the Court for failure to comply with criteria for biometric 
passports with fingerprints.  
In the previous parts, the infringement procedures in the policy areas of (1) 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship; (2) Home Affairs, have been discussed. 
After the analysis of the results that were gathered based on the presence of press 
releases, the decision was made to lift the veil of ignorance and determine the reality 
of the total number of cases with and without press releases. As previously outlined, 
several errors were found in the database, first of all, the links to the press releases were 
broken, the filter on active or closed cases is not up to date and fails to clarify when a 
case would be considered closed. The filter criterion of only displaying cases that 
include links to press releases and/or country memos was included to verify the sources 
of information. The search based on the previously outlined criteria resulted in 22 cases 
in the policy area of Justice Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. The same search in 
the policy area of Home Affairs resulted in 13 hits. The same search, but without the 
filter on press release/memo country, resulted in 307 cases in the former, and 152 cases 
in the latter. As indicated in Figure 20 and 21, most infringement procedures in the first 
area have been initiated against Austria (26), Ireland (23) and Italy (23), and against 
Italy (17), Hungary (12) and Cyprus (10) in the second area. The figures created based 

































































































































































































































































































































































Home Affairs: Infringement cases (2002-2020)
Figure 20. Total number of cases per country: JFRC (Own elaboration). 
 







In this chapter, an analysis of the literature review and the results obtained in the 
empirical part will be conducted. The purpose of this dissertation has been studying the 
issue of the formation of public reason outside national (state) identity. Next to that, 
the aim has been to develop theoretical knowledge on the formation of public reason 
in a post-truth era.  The object of study has been European governmentality and public 
reason, and the subject has been the role of fundamental rights in the formation of 
public reason in the European Union. 
First of all, in accordance with the literature review, the role and utilisation of 
citizenship, identity, values and principles has been determined. Despite the fact that 
the constitution for Europe was never ratified, the results show that actions are still 
being taken to construct a common identity. In theory, European citizenship could be 
understood as a symbolic institution; in practice, the CFR has been framed as a symbol 
of European citizenship- this would indicate that on a certain level, a link has been 
established between human rights, the Charter (a symbol of identity), and European 
identity. On that note, it is necessary to refer to the concept of thick and thin public 
reason as introduced by Crum; the depth of public reason was described to be 
determined by the core functions carried out by a state at the domestic level. The results 
show that the EU adopted micro-technologies of governing in an attempt  to influence 
the level of self-identification of individuals with European citizenship and identity. 
These technologies do not require the expansion of EU competences established in the 
Treaties, instead, there is made use of implicit but explicit mechanisms, e.g., measuring 
the level of knowledge of Europeans on basic rights and values. In turn, input 
legitimacy has been derived from public opinion surveys on awareness and EU 
citizenship.  Particularly, on the awareness and training component, because “people 
would like to receive more information”, there is a strong need. However, by posing 
this question and measuring the responses, the results have been presented as a factual 
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observation, but are actually opinions; are you against, in between, or in favour of 
getting more knowledge about your rights and the EU? Consequently, the following 
question could be posed: why would you be against receiving knowledge about where 
to find information about your rights? Can these opinions be treated as legitimate for 
the justification of the need to further integrate and construct normative standards of 
collaboration and behaviour? In accordance with the formulation of the strategy, it can. 
Nevertheless, I would propose to consider that increasing the basic level of an average 
citizen on their national rights and laws would (not) deserve prioritization over efforts 
taken to spread awareness about European identity.  
Apart from that, what is missing in the latest strategy is the discussion of the use 
of available opportunities (Habermas, 1995) in contrast with the opportunities offered- 
if the Charter is indeed a list of rights familiar to the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, there would not be a need to put a focus on its promotion. After all, 
strategies are part of public policy, and public policy is developed based on the need 
of a society, which would require standard methods of policy and program evaluation, 
not a justification based on a public opinion poll about the interest in receiving 
information. 
The framing of the infringement cases against Cyprus and Malta is an interesting 
example of the change in value added to the concept of citizenship. The existence of 
European citizenship is utilised to justify the need to interfere in the domestic situations 
of the two countries with regards to the granting of national citizenship, and is being 
directly linked with European values; “EU values are not for sale”. 
 Therefore, a question that could be posed for further research would be: what 
happens when Europeans would add more value to European identity, citizenship and 
rights, than their national identity, citizenship and rights? Next to that, it is important 
to consider the (possible) role of education (mechanisms); education is the basis for the 
construction of the ideal citizen. Considering the harmonization of education, designed 
to stimulate free movement, or the use of the Erasmus+ programme as a consciously 
chosen tool, for the spread of awareness. Consequently, another question could be 
posed, considering post-national identity construction; which (new) tools are used in 
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constructing a (post-national) citizen? At the same time, I would argue that there could 
be looked at identity vs. citizenship, as identities are the entities that can be influenced. 
Secondly, the two strategies on the implementation of the CFR have been 
analysed and compared to determine the redefinition and recontextualization of values 
and principles. Considering the identity crisis of contemporary nation states, the rise of 
populism and identity politics, the construction of a fragile and imagined concept as 
identity is subject to different actors trying to manipulate the self-identification of 
individuals, among which the EU appears as this “neutral” actor promoting human 
rights across the globe. As previously mentioned, a link has been established between 
human rights and a symbol of European identity, which could possibly lead to a rise of 
expectations of citizens. In turn, a friction between obeying/adhering/living by a certain 
set of standards, would be created. However, since intuition is not determined by a 
legal classification, but self-identification, trust and the meaning that is given to it, I 
would argue that; the more people believe and trust, the sooner impetus will be given 
for its realisation. It should be kept in mind that the current reality is likely to be in its 
beginning stages of this formation. 
 The results show that, in 2010, the focus was laid on the creation of a 
fundamental rights culture that would serve as a compass guiding the work of 
institutions. The legally binding status of the Charter reflects the integration of 
normative outlooks into legal principles.  
Furthermore, the main narrative of this strategy has been concerned with 
upholding and protecting EU fundamental rights and values; a shared responsibility, a 
collective effort, that could only be achieved if, civil society organisations would be 
sufficiently equipped with tools required to ensure the effective application in practice 
in a supportive environment. The expansion of the engagement of individuals and civil 
society organisations in transnational relations enables the participants to directly 
incorporate common sets of values and justification in their self-governance. The 
results of the analysis conducted on the strategies (CFR) indicate that, as of 2020, 
stakeholders would have an active role in the integration of fundamental rights in the 
normative standards of the EU. Thereby, a new value chain would be created, in which 
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local groups would be directly targeted without the necessity to firstly address the 
government of a country. As stated by Kjaer, once normative outlooks become part of 
legal principles, norms obtain an indirect strategic role, and turn into tools guiding 
decision-making processes. On that note, the results show that the CFR did not only 
gain an indirect strategic role, it was given a direct strategic role in guiding, not solely, 
decision-making processes, but in establishing normative standards of behaviour as 
well. However, the CFR has not been taken as the foundation from which reasoning 
takes place, but as a check-list that is applied afterwards. And a check-list culture is 
something people make jokes about on a daily basis. In policy science, a model is a 
representation of a reality, but the danger exists that this simplification of reality will 
come to shape our realities. And this specifically, can be observed in the approach taken 
in the strategies, where strategic intensions are presented as goals, rather than being 
reformulated into genuine goals that are informed by a moral identity, and where 
opinions are presented as factual evidence that were gathered to answer this question 
specifically, and are utilised as input legitimacy, it turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In turn, the following question could be raised; which ethics are taken into account in 
the formulation of something as a strategy on the implementation of the CFR in the 
EU?  
Even though the CFR may not be interpreted in a way that it would extent EU 
competences, it is used in an explicit way to implicitly shape and guide behaviour. And 
by strategically utilising law as a framework for justification, there is moved beyond 
the need to expand on EU competences, taking place through processes of socialisation.  
Moreover, the attempt to strengthen the credibility and to maintain the integrity 
of the EU at the international stage, and efforts to ensure the “compliance” with 
common values inside the EU are two sides of the same coin. Even though, the focus 
in the strategies was laid on visualising the rights of citizens, the underlying narrative 
seemed to be dominated by the focus on external action in relation to the Union’s 
credibility in promoting human rights worldwide. Therefore, I would suggest 
differentiating between image creation and positive behaviour activation.  
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Next, the fact that Article 7 has been “replaced” by newly proposed mechanisms 
and strategies of enforcement could be explained by the fact that the EU has been 
unable to uphold its common values and fundamental rights inside the Union. The need 
to strengthen the application of fundamental rights in the EU was motivated by the, 
what I would frame as, legitimacy crisis of the EU, pointing at its, self-proclaimed or 
perceived, inability to uphold the rule of law and fundamental rights and values 
internally. The statement made that EU rights and values should be protected would 
imply that those rights and values are under threat. In the creation of this rhetoric, on 
the one hand, there has been referred to migration and security, and COVID-19; on the 
other hand, to the green transition and digital transformation (2020). A direct link has 
been created between the need to uphold the rule of law and fundamental rights and 
values in the EU for the sake of not losing credibility at the international stage as a 
worldwide promotor of human rights.  
The narrative “the protection of fundamental rights should not be taken for 
granted” has been created by the European Commission itself, possibly, without taking 
into consideration that the formulation and presentation of the latest strategy also 
confirms the presence of a legitimacy crisis, while “factually seen”, the number of 
infringement cases presented to the online society is relatively small. And this is about 
the post-truth of information, and the narrow selection of information is reflected in the 
online presentation of press releases of which the links were broken.  
Furthermore, the results show that, basic democratic values as a prerequisite for 
the existence of public reason exist outside a formal constitution; despite the absence 
of a ratified constitution, the governmentality of the EU continued to pursue the 
creation of a demos and a sense of unity through strategies and action plans. 
Consequently, there could be argued that European governmentality as an implicit form 
of knowledge in and beyond the EU, continues the path of European integration, 
finding its way, directly or indirectly, around the need to adopt a regulation, directive 
or decision, through the creation of action plans, annual reports, strategies, or the 
issuance of recommendations and opinions.  
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If the reliance on strong abstract normative principles in the case of the EU is 
indeed far-fetched, as argued by Kjaer, policymaking frameworks would turn into 
aesthetic forms, that lack strong substance and significant normative guidance. On the 
one hand, conforming Kjaer, there could be argued that policy frameworks indeed turn 
into aesthetic forms lacking a strong substance and significant normative guidance. On 
the other hand, the comparison of the two strategies shed light on the complexification 
and professionalisation of building an interrelation between common values and 
fundamental rights in all policy areas by the EU. In addition, efforts taken to 
institutionalise values and fundamental rights would indicate that normative guidance 
is not only present, it actually came to govern European governmentality. Likewise, 
there could be argued that, efforts taken by the EU have started to move beyond abstract 
normative principles; “The Charter is not a text setting out abstract values, it is an 
instrument to enable people to enjoy the rights enshrined within it when they are in a 
situation governed by Union law” (European Commission, 2010, p. 3). Next to that, it 
is an interesting observation that the Charter has been presented as an EU bill of rights, 
while the constitution for Europe was never ratified, efforts are continued to be taken 
to (further) construct a European Union and a European citizen by further establishing 
common practices of collaboration. Therefore, there could be argued that, the absence 
of a ratified constitution does not result in a change of mentality, but has been a reason 
to develop and make use of other mechanisms through which normative standards 
could be created. 
Finally, the results of the analysis of the infringement procedure database of the 
European Commission demonstrate that there is a distortion between infringement 
procedures presented to the public and the actual number of cases. The aim of this 
study, however, is not to account for the reasons why only a small selection of cases 
has been presented through case specific press releases, but to discuss the fact that only 
a limited number of cases has been presented. The presentation of the cases outlined in 
the results could be perceived as a tool used to establish normative standards of 
behaviour. At the same time, efforts were taken to analyse the press room of the 
European Parliament, observing it as a European citizen in search of discussions and 
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press releases or news articles related to Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
The attempted analysis of the platform shows that the website of the European 
Parliament does not meet the criteria of transparency and accessibility, and therefore 
obstructs the ability to carry out the duty of civility; doing what they can to hold 
government officials to it. The fifth element of the permanent structure of the idea of 
public reason is concerned with “Citizens' checking that the principles derived from 






The purpose of this dissertation was to study the issue of the formation of public 
reason outside national (state) identity, with the EU as a case study, and to develop 
theoretical knowledge of the formation of public reason in a post-truth era. In the 
globalising and digitalising world, a shift has been taking place in the functions, and 
understanding of those functions, of the main structure governing a demos, no longer 
bound by geographical borders. In this aspect, debates have been taking place 
concerning the implementation of theoretical concepts that could be understood as tied 
to statehood, in the context of international cooperation. The European Union was 
described as a unique example of a “government” existing outside the nation state, an 
unidentifiable political object, that entered the path of political integration, and in the 
search for political legitimation, an increasing focus was laid on the process of 
subjectivation of a European demos. In this process, the appeal to a set of shared values 
and rights obtained a significant role.  
First of all, the utilisation of the concept of governmentality as a method to study 
the EU proved to be useful; it allowed for the visualisation of tools and mechanisms 
employed in shaping, guiding, and managing behaviour; strategies, action plans, and 
the strategic use of law as a framework for justification. Based on the results and the 
discussion, the conclusion can be made that, the underlying thought of European 
governmentality never left the reality of a constitutional democracy, and is driven by 
the need to spread and institutionalise common values in the governance, in, of, and by 
the EU. On that note, the understanding that a constitutional democracy is a 
prerequisite of public reason, could be adjusted, by letting go of the strict definition of 
a constitutional democracy.  
Secondly, the study on public reason in the EU shed light on the key role of basic 
democratic values and the existence of a set of shared norms and values under a 
common political structure. Throughout the course of European integration, efforts 
were taken to further democratize the Union, establishing European citizenship, and 
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the institutionalisation of common values and fundamental rights. Therefore, the 
conclusion could be made that, tools used to create unity, identity, shared values, rights, 
and culture could be key in a post-truth era. The EU has been moving beyond its legal 
scope with the use of implicit tools in developing and maintaining normative standards 
of behaviour. Nevertheless, the question to what extent the employment of 
corresponding tools for different purposes is ethical, is a question I would leave open 
for debate.  
Moreover, the comparison of the Charters demonstrated that rights have been 
classified as goods; the implicit classification of rights as goods in the EU indicates 
that those goods could be distributed. Taking into consideration that normative issues 
could only be evaluated based on interests or values provided for by goods, offering 
justifications for the extension of technologies related to the distribution of rights as 
goods, could be potentially limitless, as rights have a positive connotation; it would be 
difficult to object to actions derived from the positive distribution of rights as goods. 
Furthermore, the conclusion can be made that levels of political obligations 
resulting in the exercise of collective political autonomy, are no longer solely 
determined by the state [Member States], instead, with the introduction of EU 
citizenship, a direct relation between the EU and citizens has been established, with 
consequent anticipations, of which the implications have been visualised in this case. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that, the scope of consequences ruled through justice 
that is determined by the extent to which a shared framework of political deliberation 
enables its justification, is no longer bound to the interpretation of Member States only. 
Thus, the formation of public reason in the European Union is no longer dependent on 
the positions taken by Member States as legitimate representatives of the people to 
provide this position, i.e., the positions taken by Member States as representatives of 
their peoples could be different from the positions taken by the peoples they represent. 
In my opinion, there is a need for a moral identity;  blunt aims and goals should 
be genuinely reformulated: if someone would offer you help, and they say; I am only 
offering you help because it is good for my image- would you accept that help? – these 
are the things that should be kept inside. Speaking about the need for a moral identity, 
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it is necessary to refer back to one of the concepts outlined in the introduction of this 
dissertation; the need for a third-person perspective. In this understanding, a third-
person perspective would require those involved in the forum to adopt the perspective 
of one of the others, not by choice but by random selection, or to apply a general third-
person perspective. 
The stage was set based on an interpretation of the post-truth era, arguing that, 
it did not only come to shape the realities of citizens, but the formation of public reason 
as well. The results showed that, EU action has obtained a significant normative 
foundation, that is, value-based principles informing decision-making, as well as 
internal and external relations. Governmentality was expected to differ in each 
situation, while the core values do not change, its interpretation does. In turn, attention 
is paid to the ways in which rule is made possible. The results of the analysis of 
European integration visualised the increasing focus on democratization and 
citizenship. At the same time, new areas of collaboration were established, which led 
to the formation of new common practices, especially in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. In turn, those common practices led to the establishment of a shared set of 
reasons and political conceptions appealed to in the public political forum. In a post-
truth era, basic democratic values, political conceptions of justice, shared frameworks 
of deliberation, in the absence of a ratified democratic constitution, can be further 
established through governmentality, employing micro-practices of governing, 
implicitly establishing normative standards of behaviour, and using not only law as a 
strategic framework for the justification of political decisions, but the appeal to 
emotions, beliefs, values and norms as well. Realities have been changing, and so 
should the approaches that are taken in theory. 
Finally, as stated in the introduction “a conception of post-truth is to be kept in 
mind when interpreting the to be presented information”- its presence has been implicit 
throughout the discussion, its existence is implicit; the categorisations offered in the 
introduction of this dissertation, were based on one of the perceptions I have on the 
shape of a post-truth. The efforts taken to obtain sources of information through EU 
websites were not in vain; the links to the Eurobarometers to outline the values of 
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Europeans, are no longer available; the website changed, resulting in a decrease of 
usability, complicating the Duty of Civility. What do we base our opinion on when 
information keeps disappearing and the selection of presentation, not even considering 
the changes in communication and argumentation, is everything but transparent? Who 
decides which information appears and disappears in all of its shapes? The 
interpretation of a post-truth is left open for those who got an implicit gist of it while 
reading this dissertation. 
From Ancient Greece to the twenty-first century. Humankind. Theories 
competing for attention on how to explain how society is ought to function. Different 
rationales are employed by nation states, different rationales exist within nation 
states, mentalities and identities are created beyond nation states.  
What is our final destination? It is human nature, psychological, it will never 
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Appendix 2. Scope of EU Law 
 
 




May legislate and 
adopt legally 
binding acts (Art. 
2(1) TFEU) 
Customs union, competition 
rules, monetary policy (MS 
with Euro), conservation of 
marine biological resources 
under common fisheries 
policy (Art. 3 TFEU) 
International 
agreements within 





EU and MS may 
legislate and adopt 
Internal market; social policy; 
economic, social, territorial 












Shared legally binding acts 
(Art. 2(2) TFEU) 
consumer protection; 
transport; trans-European 
networks; energy; area of 
freedom, security and justice; 
common safety concerns in 











common policy) – 
will not result in 





Supporting (Art. 6 
TFEU) 




Protection and improvement 
human health; industry; 
culture; tourism; education, 
vocational training, youth and 
sport; civil protection; 
administrative cooperation 
(Art. 6 TFEU) 
  
 
Figure 6. Sources of law 
Primary Secondary Supplementary 
Treaties- TEU, TFEU, Euratom Unilateral acts Case law of CJEU 
Specify distribution of competences 
between EU and MS 
Regulations, directives, decisions, 
opinions, recommendations (Art. 
288 TFEU) 
International law 
Legal framework  Atypical acts, communications and 
resolutions, white and green papers 
General principles of law 
Amending EU treaties, protocols 
annexed, treaties on accession, 
Charter on Fundamental Rights, 
general principles of law per CJEU 
  
 
Figure 7. Types of EU legislation (Own elaboration) 
Regulation General application; binding in its entirety 
Directive Law binds (a group of) MS to achieve a particular objective; 
translated into national law: MS decide how the specified results is 
to be achieved 
Decision Addressed to MS, groups of people, individuals: binding in its 
entirety 







Table 2. Legal basis of the area of freedom, security and justice (Own elaboration) 
CREATION AFSJ 
TITLE V TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION Article 3 (2) TEU 
      LINKED WITH   
LEGAL SOURCE ARTICLE Topic CHARTER CONVENTION   
TEU 16   CFR ECHR 
TFEU 8 Elimination of inequalities 
TFEU 15(3) Access to institution's documents 
TFEU 16 Protection personal data 
TFEU 18-25 







Appendix 3. Comparison strategies on CFR 
2020 
Ensuring effective application by MS 
Partnering with MS 
  




National and local administrations, MS parliaments, law enf. A 
 
  Central to promo and protect   
Prevention   
Promotion and application e-Justice portal 
Coordination Charter focal point 
Enforcement Guardian of the Treaties 
  New Annual report [FR in digital age] 
Charter in EU funding 
Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) 
Empowering CSO, rights defenders, justice practitioners 
Protecting CSO and right defenders 
  
A supportive environment 
Strong and independent NHRIs 
Capacity building to defend people's rights 
Supporting judges and other law practitioners 
Fostering use of Charter as a compass for EU institutions 
Update and develop tools EC 
  Must comply 
Charter mainstreaming throughout 'European' leg. process 
  EP and Council 
Strengthening awareness 
Information campaign 




Union must be exemplary 
Fundamental rights culture 
Preparatory consultations 
Impact assessments 
  Mainstreaming FR into Impact Assessment steering groups 
  Operational guidance on FR 
  Impact assessment board 
Drafting of acts 
  Targeted recitals 
  Summary FR issues in expl mem 






Ensuring MS respect Charter.. 
Prevention 
Infringement procedures 
Outside scope Charter 
Better informing the public 
Information needs 
Rights of the child 
Knocking on the wrong door 
Lack of suitable information 
Commission action 
Information Union's role in FR 




Transparent, continuous, consistent 
Annual exchange of views (EP and Council) 
 
Appendix 3.1 Comparison elements 2020-2010 Strategies  
2020 2010 
A culture of values based on the 
rule of law, democracy and FR 
FRA forum HR 2021: awareness, 
further development of culture of values 
A fundamental rights culture/culture of 
fundamental rights 
FR culture throughout legislative process 
 
Mainstreaming 
- Charter mainstreaming EU laws 
- Equality mainstreaming toolbox 
- Charter mainstreaming throughout 
legislative process 
Mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming of FR in the Impact Assessment 
steering groups 
Prevention 
- Dialogue and support for Member 
States 
- If prevention and dialogue 
unsuccessful: capacity building 
(1) Prevention; 




- Reminding in appropriate cases, the authorities 
(…). 
 
Principles for the enforcement of fundamental 
rights:  
(1) Prevention; 
(2) Infringement procedures;  
(3) Situations outside the scope of the Charter 
- Article 7 TEU - mechanism 
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Promotion and implementation 
Comply with EU law.. 
- MS promote development of tools, 
monitoring mechanisms, trainings 
and strategies 
- Encourage mutual learning 
o European e-Justice portal 
o Council: working party 
FREMP 
Coordination 
- Cooperation and communication 
between different levels of 
government, EU institutions, rights 
defenders, CSOs 
- MS encouraged to appoint a Charter 
focal point 
Enforcement 
- New Annual report 
o See annual report 
- Infringement procedure 
o EC as guardian of the 
Treaties 
o Launch.. as appropriate 











- EC as guardian of the 
Treaties 
- All means at disposal 
ensure adherence.. 
- Non-compliance with 
CFR 
- Part of Annual Report 






- 2021 new annual report 
- EP and the Council- organisation of 
substantive discussion 
- Partnership EU institutions and 
agencies 
o FRA info and data 
o Expert groups MS 
o Sources… 
o FR in the digital age 
Annual report 
Partnership with institutions and stakeholders, 





Appendix 4. Infringements 
 
 
Figure 22. Total number of case per years: JFRC (Own elaboration). 
 
 




























































2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Infringement cases Home Affairs per year
